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30.1 Preface. - A note on pile driving and doubt
It is often argued that Karl Popper's philosophy of science is the basis for much
of the research in the ¯eld of economics (Smith, 1998). With Popper's philosophy
naive induction must give way to deductive logic. In addition, Popper has a modest
level of ambition with regard to the goals of science: The scienti¯c objective is
\Truth", but we will never know whether we have found \the Truth", and it is not
certain that science will ever achieve \the Truth". Our knowledge does not have
solid foundation. In the words of Popper (1959, p. 111):
\The empirical basis of objective science has nothing \absolute" about it.
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural
or \given" base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we
have reached ¯rm ground. We simply stop when we are satis¯ed that the
piles are ¯rm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being."
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and under-
standing of mechanisms at work in the market for general practitioners' services by
confronting theory with data. In Poppers terminology, this dissertation is hopefully
contributing to some "pile driving" within the economics of general practice. There
will always be room for doubt however, and importantly, anyone convinced that
"the Truth" is revealed will hopefully experience some scepticism. In the words
of Fuchs (1986) in a reply to a previous discussion on the phenomenon of supplier
induced demand:
\...This ... has always reminded me of the story of the Frenchman who
suspected that his wife was unfaithful. When he told his friend that the un-
certainty was ruining his life, the friend suggested hiring a private detective
to resolve the matter once and for all. He did so, and a few days later the
detective came and gave his report: `One evening when you were out of town
I saw your wife get dressed in a slinky black dress, put on perfume, and go
down to the local bar. She had several drinks with the piano player and when
the bar was closed they came back to your house. They sat in the living
4room, had a few more drinks, danced, and kissed.' The Frenchman listened
intently as the detective went on: `Then they went upstairs to the bedroom,
they playfully undressed one another, and got into bed. Then they put out the
light and I could see no more.' The Frenchman sighed `Always that doubt,
always that doubt.' "
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(Godager, G. and H. Lurº as). Essay 3 is accepted for publication in Health
Economics.
Essay 4: \Service Motives and Pro¯t Incentives Among Physicians" (Godager, G.,
C.A. Ma and T. Iversen). Essay 4 is published in International Journal of
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51 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
This dissertation consists of empirical essays within the subject of health economics.
There are four essays in applied micro-econometrics and, as data in Essays 2 and
4 have a panel format, econometric methods for panel data are applied. Tobit-
type models for limited dependent variables are applied in Essays 3 and 4, Nested
logit models for choice of general practitioner (GP) are applied in Essay 1 and in
Essay 2 modeling and estimation procedures involving latent structural variables
are applied. The market for GPs' services is the recurrent theme, and a common
feature of the empirical modeling and estimation conducted in the essays of this
dissertation is that latent variables play an important role.
There are several motivations for studying the market for GPs. GPs play a key
role and constitute the cornerstone of the health care sector in Norway and other
countries with a national health service. The GP is often a patient's ¯rst encounter
with the health care sector. In Norway the GP also acts as a \gatekeeper", and
a referral from the GP is necessary in order to receive specialized care. Further,
decisions made by GPs have a large impact on public spending such as sick-leave
bene¯ts and drug reimbursements. Due to this pivotal role of general practice, any
research providing policy guidance for the sector will potentially have noticeable
welfare e®ects.
Studying this market may also provide advances in terms of enhanced under-
standing of economic behavior in general, and within the discipline of health eco-
nomics in particular. Arrow's (1963) article describing various imperfections in the
market for medical care is often considered to mark the founding of health eco-
nomics (Culyer and Newhouse, 2000). Many of the peculiarities Arrow describes
are, indeed, present in the market for GPs' services. Asymmetric information lim-
its consumer sovereignty and creates challenges for designing appropriate contracts
and payment mechanisms. Quality of services is di±cult to observe and quantify,
and optimal consumption of health care services is di±cult to achieve. While the
general research questions in health economics are relevant in the speci¯c context
of general practice, the conditions for knowledge accumulation seem favorable as
well. The availability of detailed and disaggregated panel data enables identi¯-
6cation and quanti¯cation of the mechanisms in focus by applying a large variety
of modeling and estimation methods. In addition, one may argue that economic
theory is well suited to model individual behavior and that assumptions of rational
decision makers are more realistic when describing individuals such as GPs than
when describing institutions such as hospitals. Fuchs (2000) describes two related
missions of health economists: providing valuable input into health policy and en-
hancing understanding of economic behavior. Both missions motivate research on
the market for GPs.
Essays 1 and 2 in this dissertation focus mainly on factors in°uencing the pa-
tients' or consumers' decision to seek the services of a particular GP, while Essays
3 and 4 focus on factors in°uencing the GP's supply decision. The rest of the text
proceeds as follows: The next subsection provides a brief introduction to the topic
of this dissertation. Summaries of the four essays are given in subsection 1.3. Policy
implications of the ¯ndings are presented in subsection 1.4. Limitations and ideas
for future research are discussed in subsection 1.5. Complete versions of Essays 1-4
follow in sections 2-5.
1.2 Health economics and general practice
The health economics literature on general practice is growing. A detailed review
is beyond the scope of this text but Scott (2000) and Iversen and Lurº as (2006) o®er
extensive reviews of the economic research on general practice. In this literature the
doctor-patient relationship is often described as one of imperfect agency with the
patient as the principal and the doctor as the agent, and where important elements
such as \Quality of Care" are noncontractible (McGuire, 2000), meaning that these
elements can not form the basis for payment. In the context of general practice
these noncontractibles are most likely of fundamental importance since diagnos-
tic precision and treatment outcomes are determined, at least partly, by provider
e®ort. Therefore regulators are concerned about noncontractibles when designing
the payment system. The most prominent payment mechanisms in general practice
are ¯xed salary, fee-for-service payment and capitation (with or without risk ad-
justment), and combinations of these. Results from the literature on GP behavior
support the idea that the way in which services are paid for in°uences how services
are delivered. As described in Iversen and Lurº as (2006), salaried GPs receive the
7same income irrespective of the number of treated patients, and this may result in
low productivity. Further, while salaried GPs do not have incentives to over-supply
certain tests and examinations, they do not have incentives to economize on the
use of factor inputs. Fee-for-service payment seems to encourage the provision of
services, and the resulting service volume can be higher than optimal. Under capi-
tation payment the GPs internalize all costs associated with the treatment and, in
contrast to fee-for-service payment, one is more likely to achieve cost-minimizing
combinations of factor inputs. On the other hand, capitation payment may create
incentives to minimize e®ort by engaging in unnecessary referring and prescribing
in order to minimize own workload. In the UK, the introduction of the fundhold-
ing scheme in general practice encouraged GPs to internalize the costs of referring
patients for specialist care. Under the fundholding scheme GPs were provided with
a budget to cover drug costs and costs for elective surgery for their patients. Any
budget surplus was retained in the practice; fundholding can therefore be regarded
as an extended form of capitation. Dusheiko et al. (2006) found that the scheme
contributed to a \downward pressure" on the number of secondary care admissions.
Newhouse (1996) refers to pure capitation or pure fee-for-service systems as
\corner solutions" and suggests that the optimal payment system for health care
providers, is a mixed system:
If pure fee-for-service results in overservicing and pure capitation in under-
servicing, the optimal scheme is a mixture.
The advantages of mixed payment mechanisms are an important result from the
literature on industrial organization of health care markets; the current payment
system for GPs in the UK may be an example of how results from research are put
into practice: Currently, most of the GPs in UK are paid under a contract consisting
of a mix of capitation, lump sum allowances, fee-for-service and payment according
to the so called Quality and Outcomes Framework (Gravelle et al., 2008). The
introduction in the UK of the Quality and Outcomes framework, which monitors
outcome based on 146 quality indicators, signals an increasing focus on quality in
the context of GPs' services.
Concerns for quality of services seem to be increasing in Norway as well. The
reform in general practice, implemented in 2001, re°ected the view that giving
8GPs responsibility for a particular list of individuals, while simultaneously high-
lighting the patient's right to choose and switch general practitioners, would result
in increased competition among GPs and improvements in accessibility and quality.
Studies based on data from the Norwegian Survey of Living Conditions con-
ducted by Statistics Norway suggest that an improvement in accessibility has oc-
curred after 2001: The average time a patient has to wait from booking a consulta-
tion until the consultation occurs has been reduced. The proportion of patients who
receive an appointment within the same day doubled (from 11% to 22%) and the
median wait was reduced from 4 to 2 days from 2001 to 2005 (Godager et al., 2007).
Lurº as (2007) describes the degree to which Norwegian patients express satisfaction
with their GP along ¯ve quality dimensions, and ¯nd that most respondents are
largely satis¯ed with the quality of services provided by their regular GP.
Latent variables
A characteristic of health economics is that variables of crucial importance are
often unobservable to agents in the market and researchers studying the market;
application of models involving latent variables is therefore prevalent (Jones, 2000,
p. 268). Latent variables are also a common feature of the four essays in this
dissertation. The motivation behind the latent variable speci¯cation is di®erent
across essays. In Essay 1 the latent variable approach is used to motivate the logit
model and the random utility framework. The utility consumer n obtains when
selecting GP j from within set, J, is of course not observable, what is observed is
only the choice that is made. Still it is reasonable to infer that the latent utility of
the consumer associated with the other alternatives is lower.
The motivation behind the latent variable speci¯cation in Essay 2 is somewhat
di®erent. For some variables it is not obvious what scale of measurement is relevant;
the quality of health care services is an example of this type of variable. In addition
to lacking a scale of measurement, quality is often considered to be unobservable
to agents in the market as well as researchers. In the literature, quality of services
is frequently represented or measured by applying proxies or indicators of quality
such as the in-hospital mortality rate. There is a growing literature studying the
e®ect of various market characteristics on observed mortality rates (Gaynor, 2006).
The rationale for applying mortality rates as a measure of quality is often not
9discussed in these papers. One may argue however that the mortality rate is an
outcome measure, that is, the result of a process where quality is actually one of
several inputs. One may argue that quality of health care services is related not
only to the length of life but also to the quality of life, and hence that mortality
rate is only one of several possible indicators of quality. Further it is obvious that
two health care providers with the same level of observed mortality rates are not
necessarily of equal quality, as both case mix and the rate of hospital infections
may, of course, di®er. When several indicators of quality is available, the question
arising is, how should one weigh these indicators in order to interpret variations
in unobservable quality? This is one of the issues addressed in Essay 2 in which
the relationship between health care quality and demand is modeled by applying
LISREL modeling and estimation procedures. (JÄ oreskog, 1977, Aigner et al., 1984)
The censored regression models applied in Essays 3 and 4 are also based on
latent variable speci¯cations. The censored regression model proposed by Tobin
(1958) was developed to model the demand for durable goods, but these so called
tobit models also proved useful in the context of models for labor supply (Mof-
¯tt, 1999). The special feature of tobit type censored regression models is that
the latent variable is observable when the realized values are in a certain range or
exceed a threshold. Labor supply is inherently non-negative, and the latent labor
supply is unobservable when decision makers choose not to participate in the labor
market. In Essay 3 and 4 institutional details from prevailing regulations are of
fundamental importance in specifying empirical models. According to prevailing
regulations, the municipalities can require GPs to work up to 7.5 hours per week
with community health service tasks. In standard labor markets labor supply is
censored at zero, in this case we must allow the censoring threshold to be GP
speci¯c and allow it to vary in the interval [0, 7.5] hours. Essay 4 di®ers from the
third essay in that a censored regression model is estimated by applying panel data,
and a latent variable speci¯cation is used to represent unobserved heterogeneity of
physicians in this random e®ects tobit model. In summary, all the 4 essays in this
dissertation constitute examples of what can be achieved if one is willing to make
assumptions about the structure of what we do not observe.
10Institutional setting and data sources
Norwegian data are applied in the four essays in this dissertation. Norway has
a national health service, mainly ¯nanced by general taxation. In all four essays
some of the data are from the Norwegian primary physician database, which de-
scribes characteristics of each GP and each GP's patient list. This database was
established in connection with the introduction of the list system in general prac-
tice in 2001. Under the new system GPs are paid a fee-for-service reimbursement
and a capitation per listed patient. Besides providing primary care, GPs act as
gatekeepers, and a referral is required for consultations with health care specialists.
Patients pay a copayment of about e 15 per consultation with their GP. National
insurance covers copayments if expenditures for physician services and medicines
within a year exceed a ceiling.
The Norwegian primary physician database is administered by the Norwegian
Social Science Data Services and provides information about individual GPs. For
Oslo, the capital of Norway, and 13 other municipalities the database also includes
more detailed information at the level of the individual inhabitant. For these 14
municipalities the registry data include information on address, wealth, income and
education in addition to the individual's revealed preferences for GPs. This infor-
mation is available due to the signi¯cant e®ort made by the Norwegian authorities
to involve individuals in the introduction of the list system: In order to imple-
ment the reform and list each inhabitant with a GP, every inhabitant was asked
to return a response form ranking their three most preferred GPs in descending
order. Since the submitted ranking information was intended for use in the actual
matching process forming each GP's patient list, this material constitutes a unique
source of information about individuals' revealed preferences for GPs. This rank-
ing information is applied in di®erent ways in Essay 1 and Essay 2. Survey data
describing the GPs' participation in the community health service was collected in
two waves, in 2002 and 2004. The survey data were merged with registry data from
the Norwegian primary physician database. Survey data are applied in Essays 3
and 4.
111.3 Summary of essays
Summary of Essay 1: Birds of a Feather Flock Together: A Study of
Doctor-Patient Matching
In this paper we study individuals' choice of GPs utilizing revealed preferences
data collected during the introduction of the regular general practitioner scheme
in Norway. The individual consumer's choice of GP is modeled within the random
utility framework, and the main hypothesis is that patients prefer doctors who re-
semble themselves on observable characteristics. Using information about relevant
travel distances, we compute decision makers' travel costs associated with two dif-
ferent modes of travel: travel by taxi and travel by means of private car. Choice
probabilities are then estimated by means of nested logit regression. The nested
speci¯cation is chosen because GPs located in the same neighborhood are expected
to be closer substitutes compared to GPs located in di®erent neighborhoods.
An important feature of earlier studies of GP choice applying revealed prefer-
ence data is that the possibility of endogenous sample selection is not taken into
account. One may argue that this is a limitation because it is not obvious that
individuals showing active interest in engaging in provider choice are representative
of the general population. In the present paper we observe that a larger share of
females than males returned their GP preferences. We also observe that individuals
with many years of schooling and high income are over-represented among indi-
viduals submitting provider preferences, while younger individuals, people born in
a foreign country, and people with recent unemployment spells are clearly under-
represented. The present paper contributes to the literature by utilizing revealed
preference data in a setting where we are able to account for the potential selection
bias resulting from endogenous sample selection. Having access to data describing
the total population we are able to construct a representative sample of decision
makers by means of the propensity score matching method. Hence, the nested logit
regression is estimated applying a representative sample of Oslo inhabitants. The
results support the general hypothesis that patients prefer doctors who resemble
themselves on observable characteristics: Individuals prefer GPs having the same
gender and similar age. Specialist status of GPs was found to have a smaller e®ect
on choice probabilities than other attributes such as GP's gender and country of
12birth: When travel costs are calculated by means of taxi prices, the estimated will-
ingness to pay for consulting a GP with the same gender is e 1.71 and e 3.55 for
female and male decision makers, respectively, whereas the estimated willingness
to pay for specialist status of a GP is e 0.89 per consultation. The corresponding
willingness to pay estimates are smaller when travel costs associated with travel by
private car are applied.
At the time our data were collected, GPs who were specialists in general
medicine received an additional fee of e 6.80 per consultation from the National
Insurance Scheme, while the patients' out of pocket fee for consulting a specialist in
general medicine was the same as for consulting a non-specialist. The results thus
indicate that average willingness to pay for consulting a specialist is considerably
lower than the additional fee that specialists receive from the National Insurance
Scheme.
Summary of Essay 2: Does Quality In°uence Choice of General
Practitioner? An Analysis of Matched Doctor-Patient Panel Data
The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically whether the demand facing a
general practitioner (GP) responds to the quality of the provided services. The im-
pact of quality on the demand for health care providers has important implications
for the industrial organization of health care markets. In this paper we study the
consumers' choice of GP assuming that they are unable to observe the true quality
of GP services. A panel data set for 484 Norwegian GPs, with summary infor-
mation on their patient stocks, provides the opportunity to identify and measure
the impact of GP quality on demand, accounting for patient health heterogeneity
in several ways. Two kinds of models are considered: a panel data model with
latent heterogeneity related to GP quality and a multi-equation LISREL type of
model, including both GP quality and the health of the stock of persons on the
GP's list as latent variables, both of which are assumed to a®ect demand as well
as other observed variables. The patient excess mortality rate at the GP level is
one indicator of quality.
An important issue addressed in this paper is the potential selection occur-
ring as a result of heterogeneity of patients' skill or ability to collect and process
available quality information. This heterogeneity may induce selection mechanisms
13resulting in systematic di®erences in patient morbidity and patient mortality be-
tween GPs with di®erent levels of quality. We have no prior knowledge of the
direction in which this selection mechanism might operate. On the one hand, less
healthy consumers, with a high expected mortality rate, might be particularly con-
cerned about their choice of GP and as a result more willing to collect information
than the average consumer. This may contribute to increasing average mortality
rate among the patients listed with high-quality GPs. On the other hand, con-
sumers who are healthier, more resourceful and have low expected mortality may
be particularly able to collect and process such information. This could reverse the
selection mechanism, i.e., lowering the average mortality rates of the persons listed
with high-quality GPs. Consequently, a priori, we cannot postulate that patient
heterogeneity will result in a di®erence in the average health status of patients
of high-quality vs. low-quality GPs or the direction of the di®erence, if it exists.
However, failing to control for di®ering aggregate health status of listed patients
may result in a simultaneity bias and/or an excluded variable bias when estimat-
ing the e®ect of quality on demand. Our LISREL approach separates the e®ect of
quality on excess mortalities from the e®ect of health at the level of the GP through
the exclusion restrictions imposed on the measurement equations for Quality and
Health: six variables describing the GP are included in the measurement equa-
tions for Quality, but excluded from the measurement equations for Health, while
three variables are included in the measurement equations for Health but excluded
from the measurement equations for Quality. We estimate the e®ect of the quality
variable on the demand for each GP's services. Our results, obtained from two
di®erent econometric model versions, indicate that GP quality has a clear positive
e®ect on demand.
This paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, no previous empirical
studies seem to have considered the demand e®ects of quality in the market for GPs.
Second, in the current literature the relationship between demand and various
indicators of quality, such as mortality rates, failure rates or hospital type, and
other independent variables, are estimated separately. The paper contributes to
the literature by simultaneously estimating the relationship between demand and
quality and the way in which quality becomes manifest via indicators, applying
linear structural equation modeling (LISREL) and estimation methods. Taking
14this approach, we acknowledge both the multidimensional nature of the quality
concept, and that it may be more appropriate to interpret outcome measures such
as mortality rates or failure rates as indicators of quality, rather than as direct
measures of quality. Third, our econometric model provides a method to separate
the e®ect of quality on outcome measures from the e®ect of patient health.
Summary of Essay 3: Dual Job Holding General Practitioners: The
E®ect of Patient Shortage
In 2001, a list patient system with capitation payment was introduced in Norwe-
gian general practice. After the allocation process by which each inhabitant was
listed with a GP, a considerable share of GPs had fewer persons listed than they
would have preferred. In this paper we examine whether GPs who experience a
shortage of patients, to a larger extent than other GPs, seek to hold a second job
in the community health service even though the wage rate is low compared to the
payment in general practice. While privately practicing GPs are responsible for
providing general medical services to persons listed in their practices, the munici-
palities' community health service consists of certain segments of the primary-care
sector that are not part of the domain of general practice:
² Administration of the primary health-care sector;
² Public health services such as the preparation of infectious disease plans;
² Certain medical tasks such as routine examinations of infants and children
at childcare centers and schools, and regular medical care at nursing homes,
prisons and other institutions.
These tasks in the community health service are carried out by GPs having part-
time positions in the municipality.
Assuming utility maximization, we model the e®ect of patient shortage on a
GP's decision to contract for a second job in the community health service. The
model predicts a positive relationship between patient shortage and participation
in the community health service.
Applying data from 387 GPs practicing in 26 municipalities in Norway and
two districts in Oslo (the capital city), we estimate a censored regression model,
15taking account of labor supply as a censored variable. In standard labor markets,
individuals who choose not to o®er their working capacity to the market will be
observed with a labor supply of 0 hours, i.e. the variable is censored at zero.
Because the municipalities can require GPs to contract for up to 7.5 hours per
week we must allow the GP's speci¯c censoring threshold to vary in the interval
[0, 7.5] hours.
The results indicate that GPs experiencing a shortage of patients contract for
more hours with the community health service, and that the longer the constrained
GPs' lists are, the fewer hours are contracted for. The estimated marginal e®ect
of patient shortage is 1.72 hours per week. The e®ect of wage rate is statistically
signi¯cant and the coe±cient has the expected sign. The estimated marginal e®ect
of wage rate indicates that increasing the wage rate by one e increases the GPs'
observed labor supply by 0.154 hours per week. This result corresponds to condi-
tional supply elasticity with respect to wage rate of 0.32. When standard errors
are calculated by means of the delta method, the 95% con¯dence interval of the
conditional supply elasticity is [0.018,0.629], which is comparable in magnitude to
physician labor supply elasticities found in earlier studies. We also observe a signi¯-
cant e®ect of being a specialist in community medicine, and as expected, specialists
in community medicine supply more hours than GPs without this speciality.
Summary of Essay 4: Service Motives and Pro¯t Incentives Among
Physicians
Essays 3 and 4 are thematically related. The number of hours supplied by the
individual GP to the community health service is studied in both essays. The two
essays approach the GPs' supply of hours to the community health service from
two quite di®erent angles. In this essay the point of departure is that GPs who
work voluntarily in the community health service for low pay may derive utility
from performing these tasks. We model physicians as health care professionals who
care about their services and monetary rewards. These preferences are heteroge-
neous. Di®erent physicians trade o® the monetary and service motives di®erently,
and therefore respond di®erently to incentive schemes. Our model re°ects the Nor-
wegian health care system. First, each private practice physician has a patient
list, which may have more or fewer patients than he desires. The physician is
16paid a fee-for-service reimbursement and a capitation per listed patient. Second,
a municipality may obligate the physician to perform 7.5 hours per week of com-
munity services. Our data consist of an unbalanced panel of 435 physicians, with
412 physicians for the year 2002, and 400 for 2004. A physician's amount of gross
wealth and gross debt in previous periods are used as proxy for preferences for
community service. First, for the current period, accumulated wealth and debt are
predetermined. Second, wealth and debt capture lifestyle preferences because they
correlate with the planned future income and spending.
The main results show that both gross debt and gross wealth have negative
e®ects on physicians' supply of community health services. Gross debt and gross
wealth have no e®ect on fee-for-service income per listed person in the physician's
practice, and positive e®ects on the total income from fee-for-service. The higher
income from fee-for-service results from a longer patient list. Patient shortage has
no signi¯cant e®ect on physicians' supply of community services, a positive e®ect
on the fee-for-service income per listed person, and a negative e®ect on the total
income from fee for service. The fact that the estimated e®ect of patient shortage
is not statistically signi¯cant in Essay 4 might be a result of excluding wage rate
in the community health service from the analysis. The reason for excluding this
variable was that information on the community service reimbursement rates was of
poorer quality in the second year of data collection. Another possible explanation
is that the GPs expected future income and spending, as captured by the gross
wealth and gross debt, is correlated with the indicator of patient shortage.
1.4 Policy implications
The signi¯cant e®ort of the Norwegian authorities to involve the inhabitants in
the introduction of the list system in general practice has resulted in unique data
for studying patients' revealed preferences for GPs. The results presented in this
dissertation indicate that the implementation procedure was signi¯cant in deter-
mining the size and composition of GPs' lists. List composition, in terms of age
and gender distribution, is a®ected by the preferences of the demand side, as the
results support the hypothesis that consumers prefer GPs who resemble themselves
with respect to observable characteristics. This conclusion has several policy im-
17plications. First, it is bene¯cial if the population of general practitioners in the
market resembles the population of patients. This result has further implications
regarding the substitutability of GPs, and hence the preconditions for competition
in the market for GPs. One or two available GPs in the market is perhaps not
enough to promote competition: An elderly female might hesitate to switch to a
young male GP starting a new practice. The regulator might thus want to ensure
that the group of GPs available to accept new patients consist of male and female
GPs of di®erent age categories.
The limited opportunity to switch GP in many municipalities has received much
attention in the public debate. Presently the Norwegian Ministry of Health and
Care Services proposes a sizable increase in the number of GPs, and at the same
time a reduction in the legal maximum number of patients that can be listed in
a single practice. The latter initiative re°ects a suspicion that the so-called \list
barons", with more than 2000 persons listed, o®er poor access and long waits.
However, if quality of services indeed has a positive impact on the demand facing
the GP as suggested by the results in Essay 2, one might argue that the reason
\list barons" have long lists is that they o®er services of high quality. If this is
the case, then prohibiting lists longer than, say, 2000 people will result in, ceteris
paribus, a reduction in the average quality of services in the market as patients are
forced to leave the \list barons" in order to be listed with GPs o®ering services of
lower quality.
An important issue in the public debate in Norway the last few years has been
nursing home residents' limited accessibility to GPs' services. As of today the con-
sensus appears to be that it is essential to achieve an increase in physician-hours
within nursing homes. The results from Essay 3 are important in this regard, show-
ing that GPs will respond to an increase in reimbursement rates and supply more
hours. However the supply of hours appears to be inelastic with respect to wage.
This implies that relying on the existing GPs to provide the necessary increase in
physician hours will most likely be costly. Thus an idea might be to reconsider
the strategy where physician hours in nursing homes are mainly provided by GPs
in part time positions. Hiring fulltime physicians to provide physician hours in
the nursing homes will also address the critique raised by the Norwegian Board
of Health Supervision, namely that relying on part time positions in the nursing
18homes results in a scattering of medical responsibility. According to current regu-
lations, the municipalities can require GPs to work up to 7.5 hours per week with
community health service tasks and some even argue that the general practitioners
duties in the community health service should be increased to 15 hours per week.
The results from Essay 4 support the idea of preference heterogeneity. If one ac-
cepts that there is heterogeneity in preferences, then working a certain number of
hours in the community health service is likely to a®ect the physicians di®erently.
The 7.5-hour minimum might be considered a type of \forced labor", implying that
a gain in allocative e±ciency of labor is likely to result if the minimum requirement
were removed from the current regulations.
1.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research
The fact that we make no attempt to model the demand side for labor in com-
munity health service in Essays 3 and 4 might be considered to be a limitation of
these studies. Further one might question the assumption that patient shortage is
exogenous in the censored regression models in these essays. Including the demand
side and modeling patient shortage as an endogenous event are ideas for further
research.
Essays 1 and 2 are related, since they both consider the demand for GPs. One
could note that they complement each other, each revealing limitations in the
other: Essay 1 focuses mainly on what is often referred to as horizontal product
di®erentiation (Coke versus Pepsi). The fact that people may choose di®erent GPs
for the same reason, for example to be listed with the closest GP or a GP having
the same gender, is largely ignored in Essay 2. Similarly, the quality, in terms of
vertical product di®erentiation (Lada versus Mercedes), is given less attention in
Essay 1.
A topic addressed in both Essay 1 and Essay 2 is that individuals engaging
in active provider choice may be di®erent from individuals who choose a random
provider or choose to accept the provider assigned by the authorities. As discussed
in Essay 2, heterogeneity in individuals' propensity to participate in active provider
choice may induce selection mechanisms resulting in systematic di®erences in pa-
tient morbidity and patient mortality between GPs with di®erent levels of quality.
19There are limits to the number of patients that can be listed with a GP. If one
believe that high quality GPs experience higher demand than providers of lower
quality, the high quality GPs are more likely to close the list in order to man-
age the workload. The result is that high quality providers are removed from the
opportunity set of passive or \slow" decision makers. The result of this selection
mechanism is not obvious. The results used to generate the estimation sample in
Essay 1 suggest that individuals taking active part in choice processes have more
education, higher wealth and income and are less likely to be unemployed. The re-
sults presented in Table 6 in Essay 2 indicate that individuals who took active part
in provider choice have lower expected mortality. Viewing these results together, it
is tempting to suggest that it was the healthiest individuals who took active part in
the GP choice process, and further, that these individuals were therefore listed with
the GPs o®ering the highest quality. The results presented in Essay 2, however,
indicate that the e®ect of GP quality on aggregate health state of listed patients
is not signi¯cant. An idea for future research is to explore further the association
between individuals' health state and participation in provider choice. Understand-
ing this mechanism is important, as evidence of systematic patient selection would
indicate that extensions of consumer choice in health care have implications for
equitable distribution of health care services.
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Abstract: In this paper we study individuals' choice of general practitioners (GPs) utilizing
revealed preferences data from the introduction of a regular general practitioner scheme in Nor-
way. Having information on relevant travel distances, we compute decision makers' travel costs
associated with di®erent modes of travel. Choice probabilities are estimated by means of nested
logit regression on a representative sample of Oslo inhabitants. The results support the general
hypothesis that patients prefer doctors who resemble themselves on observable characteristics:
Individuals prefer GPs having the same gender and similar age. Specialist status of GPs was
found to have a smaller e®ect on choice probabilities than other attributes such as matching gen-
der. When travel costs are calculated by means of taxi prices, the estimated willingness to pay for
specialist status of a GP amounts to e 0.89 per consultation, whereas the estimated willingness
to pay for having a GP with the same gender amounts to respectively e 1.71 and e 3.55 for
female and male decision makers, respectively.
Keywords: GP services. Discrete choice. Willingness-to-pay. Health care demand.
JEL classification: C25, C83, D12, I111. Introduction and background
When a patient consults a physician in an event of illness, the ¯rst of the physi-
cian's tasks is to reveal is the cause of illness, i.e. the diagnosis. A second task
is to recommend an appropriate treatment and ensure that the patient is compli-
ant with the treatment. Communication between the physician and the patient is
an important element in both these processes. If the information transmission is
e±cient such that physician and patient are able to communicate easily and un-
derstand each other, the physician may be more likely to succeed in setting the
correct diagnosis than if the converse was true. One may also argue that mutual
con¯dence and unconstrained communication may cause the treatment to be more
e®ective, as the degree of patient compliance is likely to be higher if the patient
receives and understands the information relevant for the treatment. Often the
doctor-patient relationship is described as a one of imperfect agency with the pa-
tient as the principal and the doctor as the agent. As described by Scott (2000,
p.1179) the communicative ability of the matched doctor-patient unit is likely to
a®ect the cost structure and the e±ciency of a consultation, and transmission of
information is thus likely to play a central role in meeting the objectives of the
patient. The process of choosing a health care provider may thus be understood
within the context of an agency paradigm, where part of the consumer's objectives
is to a®ect the degree of imperfect agency, as suggested by Scott and Vick (1999).
The consumer (principal) may mitigate agency imperfections by choosing a match-
ing doctor (agent). We follow this idea and assume that patients prefer GPs who
resemble themselves with respect to observable characteristics. This application of
the old saying that \birds of a feather °ock together" is shown to be a useful guide
in the empirical speci¯cation where we model a representative decision maker's
choice of GP within the random utility framework. The basic idea of this modeling
framework is that a decision to choose a particular GP is considered the outcome of
optimizing behavior, and a particular GP is chosen because the associated utility
is higher than that of other alternatives.
The determinants of practice choice are examined in several studies, as reviewed
in Scott (2000). Most earlier studies involving choice analysis and matching of
GPs and patients consist of analysis of individuals' stated preferences with regard
23to hypothetical GPs. Examples of studies based on choice experiments are Scott
and Vick (1998), Scott and Vick (1999), and Ryan et al. (1998). In these studies
discrete choice experiments is applied to estimate the relative impact of di®erent
attributes of hypothetical GPs. While there are some obvious advantages with
generating data in a controlled environment with appropriate sampling design,
there are also drawbacks: The results are shown to be sensitive to the design and,
in particular, the level of the attributes are shown to a®ect estimates of willingness
to pay (Ryan and Wordsworth, 2000). Even though discrete choice experiments
leave some important value judgments to the researcher, few studies use data on
patients' revealed, rather than stated preferences. One example is Dixon et al.
(1997), who examine the determinants of the rate at which patients left practices
in three English health authorities. This study focuses on patients who revealed
their preferences by switching practice without changing their home address. The
main ¯ndings are that patients are more likely to leave a practice if it is small, if it
is associated with longer travel distance and if it has shorter opening hours. They
also ¯nd that 38 percent of the patients are registered with the practice closest to
their home. Applying Norwegian data Lurº as (2003) studies the consumers' ranking
of GPs and ¯nd that individuals prefer GPs who are specialists as compared to GPs
without specialist status. Other results are that consumers prefer a GP with the
same gender, and that choice probabilities are found to be declining in the age
di®erence between GP and patient.
An important feature of the latter studies is that endogenous sample selection is
not accounted for even though one may argue that it is not obvious that individuals
showing active switching behavior are representative for the general population.
The present paper contributes to the literature by utilizing revealed preferences
data in a setting where we are able to account for the potential selection bias
resulting from endogenous sample selection. Having access to data describing the
total population we are able to construct a representative sample of decision makers
by means of the propensity score matching method. This material is well suited
to study how attributes of GPs such as age, gender and specialization a®ect the
individuals' choice of GP. The results from estimation of a nested logit model
support the hypothesis that patients prefer GPs who resemble themselves with
respect to observable characteristics. Individuals are more likely to choose a GP
24with the same gender, and the estimated choice probabilities are declining in the
age di®erence.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief description of the
Norwegian reform of general practice. Data and sampling strategy is described
in Section 3 while the econometric model is speci¯ed in Section 4. Results from
estimation are given in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy
implications of the ¯ndings.
2. Institutional setting
The data used in this study is from Norway, a country with a national health
service ¯nanced mainly through general taxation. A nationwide introduction of a
regular general practitioner scheme in 2001 serves as a natural experiment provid-
ing detailed data on individuals' preferences for GPs. In order to implement this
list patient system, every inhabitant was asked to return a response form ranking
their three most preferred GPs in descending order. Since the submitted ranking
information was intended to be used in the actual matching process forming each
GP's patient list, this material constitutes a unique source of information on indi-
viduals' revealed preferences for GPs. Under the new scheme, more than 90% of the
GPs are self-employed, with a payment system consisting of 30% per capita pay-
ment from the municipalities and 70% fee for service payment. The latter includes
out of pocket payment from patients paying a ¯xed fee per consultation (e 14.70
in 2001), with an annual ceiling. A special feature of Norwegian general practice
is that two types of general practitioners exists: some have status as specialist in
general medicine, the remaining do not have this status. GPs with specialist status
are entitled to a higher consultation fee. The additional fee (e 6.80) is ¯nanced by
the National Insurance Administration. In order to achieve the formal specialist
status the physicians are required to have more than four years of work experience
in general practice, one year of experience from an inpatient or outpatient hospital
department, and further, they need to ful¯l a post-graduate education programme.
This programme consists of courses, seminars and supervision from a senior GP.
If one believes that more education adds to GP quality, specialist status may be
considered to be an observable indicator of quality. Admittedly however, knowl-
edge on specialist status of GPs is information that most likely is not acquired
25by every decision maker. In the same way that we expect costs to a®ect choices
in situations were costs are hard to calculate1, it is meaningful to investigate the
impact of this attribute on choice probabilities. The reason is that the aim is to
model the behavior of a representative decision maker. In summary, the market
under consideration may thus be described as one where traded goods have observ-
able quality di®erentiation and no consumer price variation, as the patients' out of
pocket payments were the same for both types of GPs. An interesting question is
then, does specialist status a®ect the demand for GP services, and if so, what is
the magnitude of this e®ect?
3. Data and sampling strategy
Our data set is provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services. The
observation unit is the individual inhabitant. All inhabitants in 14 Norwegian
municipalities are included in the original data set. In this paper we will only use
observations from inhabitants and GPs in the city of Oslo. The main reason for
this decision is that an extract, containing the data from this densely populated
metropolitan area gives more precise information on travel distances, compared to
data from more rural areas where large geographical areas share the same postal
code. As we know the residential addresses of consumers and practice addresses
of GPs, a measure of the relevant travel distances in kilometers and travel time in
hours can be added from a drive-time matrix.2 One may argue that a limitation of
this study is that we do not have exact information on the travel distances of each
consumer. However, other methods of gathering information on travel distances
would most likely also be imperfect. Further, the fact that Oslo has more than 400
unique postal codes, and that the distance matrix has recorded travel distances as
short as hundred meters suggest that the measurement errors are small.
We are interested in studying the choice of sovereign consumers. Since parents
are likely to choose the GP for their children we exclude observations of consumers
1Examples include phone rates, electricity tari®s and costs associated with car travel, etc.
2The private company Infomap Norway has collected actual travel distances and travel times
associated with travel by means of a \light truck" on public roads between centers of the postal
code areas.
26younger than 18. After the exclusion of some observations where relevant infor-
mation was missing, our sample has 401999 unique observations, of which 68%
participated in the choice process. Descriptive statistics of the decision makers are
given in Table 1. In the left column we give a description of the adult population
of Oslo residents. The variable unemployed is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
an individual received any unemployment bene¯ts in the period 2000-2002, and
we se that see that 10% of the adult population has received such bene¯ts. The
variables net wealth and income consist of 10 groups categorized according to
the deciles in the 14 municipalities. From the statistics on variable net wealth
we see that 10.5% of the population has a net wealth lower than the ¯rst decile,
and we see that 10.3% has a net wealth between the ¯rst and second decile.
Only observations of individuals who returned the response forms, henceforth
referred to as participants, can be used when estimating our choice model in Section
5. Individuals who did not take part in the GP choice process, henceforth referred
to as non-participants, will therefore be excluded. As can be seen by comparing
the three columns in Table 1, the consumers who participated in the choice process
do not seem to be a representative sample of the inhabitants in Oslo.3 We observe
that a larger share of females returned their GP preferences as compared to males.
We also observe that individuals with many years of schooling and high income are
over-represented among participants, while younger individuals and people born
in a foreign country, and people who have received unemployment bene¯ts in the
years 2000-2002 is clearly under-represented. The situation at hand has similarities
with the sample selection situation described by van de Ven and van Pragg (1981).
They study the demand for deductibles in private health insurance applying survey
data where a large share of individuals returned incomplete questionnaires. They
develop a two part binary probit model with endogenous sample selection in order
to address the issue that the unobserved, and hence omitted, variable \expected
medical expenses" is likely to relate both to the probability of completing the ques-
tionnaire, and to the probability of preferring a health insurance with a deductible.
In the current situation one might suspect that the decision maker's state of health
is related both to the probability of submitting provider preferences, and to the
3Confront Table A.1 in the appendix for a description of geographic representation in Oslo
27Table 1: Descriptive statistics for exogenous variables
Population versus a self-selected and a corrected sample
sample
population self-selected corrected
Variable N=401999 n=15000 n=15000
Proportion Proportion Proportion
Female 0.522 0.581 0.520
Unemployed 0.101 0.082 0.104
Non-nordic 0.154 0.123 0.156
Schooling
1-7 Years 0.006 0.005 0.006
8-10 " 0.138 0.148 0.145
11-12 " 0.220 0.237 0.228
13 " 0.206 0.199 0.207
14 " 0.023 0.023 0.022
15-17 " 0.251 0.252 0.241
18-19 " 0.098 0.099 0.096
20+ " 0.008 0.009 0.008
age
30-40 0.238 0.207 0.238
40-50 0.171 0.177 0.170
50-60 0.147 0.174 0.149
60-70 0.084 0.106 0.084
70+ 0.137 0.166 0.137
net wealth
decilesy
1 0.105 0.089 0.103
2 0.103 0.096 0.103
3 0.101 0.088 0.098
4 0.100 0.088 0.104
5 0.101 0.083 0.101
6 0.098 0.096 0.102
7 0.097 0.109 0.099
8 0.096 0.118 0.101
9 0.097 0.116 0.094
income
decilesy
1 0.100 0.081 0.096
2 0.094 0.090 0.098
3 0.097 0.095 0.094
4 0.097 0.105 0.102
5 0.098 0.104 0.098
6 0.099 0.104 0.100
7 0.101 0.109 0.101
8 0.102 0.106 0.103
9 0.104 0.106 0.103
y Deciles are calculated from the individual observations from 14 representative municipalities included in the original ¯le.
Decile1 refer to proportion of individuals with wealth/income less than Decile1. Decile2 refer to proportion of individuals with
wealth/income between decile 1 and 2, etc.
relative valuation of the various attributes of GPs, such as GPs' specialist status.
The empirical model is set up to model the decisions made by a \representative
28decision maker". If estimation is performed on a random sample from within the
subset of self selected participants, the result may be biased coe±cients or coe±-
cients with an unclear interpretation. If the estimate of coe±cients and the average
willingness-to-pay is to have a meaningful interpretation, it is important that the
decision makers included in the estimation sample really are representative for the
population. As we are considering the choice between a large number of alterna-
tives, the binary choice selection model considered by van de Ven and van Pragg do
not seem applicable to the situation at hand. However, as we have a large number
of observations and detailed information on the characteristics of both participants
and non-participants we have the opportunity to generate a representative sample.
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we generate a representative sample of
Oslo inhabitants by applying the method of propensity score matching, replacing
non-participants with participants having approximately the same predicted par-
ticipation probability.4 The procedure may be described as follows: Let S denote
the set of Oslo inhabitants, consisting of both participants and non-participants,
expressed by S = Sp [ Snp.
1. Estimate the probability of participation applying the total population, S, and
calculate the predicted participation probability ^ ½is, i = 1:::401999;s = p;np
2. Draw a random sample s ½ S of n individuals and obtain a sample of both
participants sp and non-participants snp.
3. Replace the sampled non-participants, snp, pairwise with participants who:
(i) Are included in Sp but not included in sp , and
(ii) have approximately the same propensity score as the non-participants they
are replacing: ^ ½inp ¼ ^ ½jp
The results from the estimation of the participation probabilities are given in
Table A.2 , and the details from the matching routine is described in Table A.3
in the appendix. By comparing the means in the third column of Table 1 with
4Representative samples can be achieved by beans of strati¯ed sampling. Even though this is a
simple approach with a small number of strata, it is not feasible in our situation where the aim is
to account for a larger number of characteristics. The reason is that the number of distinct strata
becomes unmanageable as the number of variables, or categories within each variable, increase:
With 2 categories and V variables there are 2V distinct strata.
29the corresponding means of the population we see that a more balanced sample is
achieved.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for GPs. N=437
Variable Mean Std.dev
specialist 0.53 0.50




The decision makers' choice menu consists of 437 alternative GPs meaning that
437 GPs have been ranked as the most preferred GP by at least one inhabitant.5
In Table 2 we describe variables at the level of the GP. We observe that 53% of the
GPs in Oslo are specialists in general medicine, and that 80% of the GPs in Oslo
are born in Norway. Further, the average age of GPs in Oslo is 47 years and 38%
of the GPs are females, and 66% of the GPs are married.
Since travel is costly, we expect that GPs with practices that are located close
to the consumer's residential address are preferred to GPs located further away.
We expect, ceteris paribus, the choice probabilities to be decreasing in travel time
and travel distance. In order to achieve a monetary measure of the travel costs, a
set of prices for distance and time is needed. A high-cost and a low-cost mode of
travel is suggested, corresponding to travel by means of taxi and travel by means
of private car. The fare schedule of the biggest taxi company in Oslo is used to
get costs associated with taxi travel. To compute the costs associated with travel
by means of private car a cost estimate of e 0.40 per kilometer is applied, which
also corresponds to the reimbursement rate used by the Norwegian public sector
to compensate employees for using their own car on o±cial business.
The decision makers' own time is also part of travel cost. The \shadow price
of time" is of course an individual speci¯c variable and likely to be dependent of
age, health and employment status. This information is not available at the level
of the individual. A measure of the value of time spent on travel, as estimated
5We thus ignore the small number of GPs not ranked as number one by any of the decision
makers.
30by the Norwegian Institute of Transport Economics (Killi, 1999), is applied as the
monetary cost of the decision makers' time use, although using such an aggregate
is of course not beyond critique. The formulas for calculating travel costs are
presented in Table 3. The travel costs associated with traveling to the GP is
multiplied with a factor of 2, since patients travel both back and forth.6
Table 3: Formulas for calculating travel costs
Applying the fare schedule (TAXI), and a reimbursement schedule for the public sector (CAR).
Mode Prices formula
start feey (e)/km (e)/hourz
TAXI (0) 4.10 1.30 6.80 travelcosts = 2£[4.10+1.30*km+ 6.80*hrs]
CAR 0 0.40 6.80 travelcosts = 2£[ 0.40*km + 6.80*hrs ]
y Start fees are set to zero when distance is zero z In°ation adjusted values for \time spent on travel" are from Killi (1999).
For given prices, the travel costs is a linear function of distance and time.
Traveling to the GP by taxi is of course more expensive than traveling by own
car, as the kilometer price is more three times as high. An equally important issue,
however, is the fact that these two modes of transport have di®erent cost structures
as there is a starting fee required for each taxi trip.
In order to follow the idea that consumers prefer GPs who resemble themselves
on observable characteristics, our representative utility function speci¯ed in the
next section will include variables interacting characteristics of the alternative GPs
with corresponding characteristics of decision makers. In Table 4 we describe the
suggested interaction variables using the corrected sample of decision makers7. We
compute the absolute value of the age di®erence between the patient and the GP,
agedifference. We see that the average age di®erence between consumer and the
selected GP is 16 years. Since an increase in agedifference implies that that the
patient and GP are more di®erent, we expect agedifference to have a negative
e®ect on choice probabilities. The dummy variable genderff (gendermm) is
equal to one when the female (male) decision maker and the GP have the same
6I am grateful to Sverre A. C. Kittelsen for pointing this out.
7Surprisingly, 7 individuals had selected a GP in one of the other 13 municipalities in the
original data set. These individuals are excluded, and the corrected sample used for estimation
in the following sections contains 14993 individuals
31gender, and zero otherwise. We see that 23% of sample are men who chose a male
GP while 38% are women who chose a female GP. In other words, 61% chose a
GP with the same gender and 39% selected a GP with di®erent gender. We expect
genderii to have a positive e®ect on choice probabilities. The mean travel distance
between decision makers and the chosen GP is 2.64 kilometers and the mean travel
time is 0.04 hours. We also see that the mean travel cost associated with travel by
private car is e 1.42 whereas the mean travel cost associated with travel by taxi is
e 7.40.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the decision maker and chosen GP. Interaction
variables. N=14993
Variable Mean Std.dev Min max
agedifference 15.55 10.51 0 58
genderff 0.23 0.42 0 1
gendermm 0.38 0.49 0 1
kilometers 2.64 3.15 0 25.10
hours 0.04 0.05 0 0.37
cost CAR (e) 1.42 1.68 0 13.08
cost TAXI (e) 7.40 4.93 0 36.56
4. Random utility and the nested logit model
The choice of GP is a qualitative choice. Due to computational feasibility and
convenience the most popular class of qualitative choice models is logit. The nested
logit model to be derived here is a generalization of the multinomial logit (MNL)
model described by McFadden (1974), and sometimes named McFaddens choice
model. We denote by Unj the utility consumer n obtains when selecting GP j.8
Utility is equal to the sum of a component, Vnj, that is a function of variables that
are observable and often called representative utility, and a component, "nj, that
is unobservable and random, and we have:
Unj = Vnj + "nj (1)
8This deduction follows closely that of Train (2003, p. 81-85)
32The crucial part of the assumptions underlying the standard MNL model is that
the random factors, "nj, are uncorrelated over alternatives, as well as having con-
stant variance across alternatives. In the context of this paper these assumptions
would require unobservable factors related to alternative GPs located in the same
neighborhood to be uncorrelated and have the same variance. One may argue that
two GPs located in the same neighborhood are likely to be closer substitutes as
compared to two GPs located in di®erent areas. This kind of reasoning suggests
that it may be appropriate to specify a nested logit model where GPs who are close
substitutes are considered to belong to the same nest. Fortunately, it is straightfor-
ward to relax the restrictive assumptions underlying the standard MNL model and
specify a nested logit model where the MNL model is included as a special case.
The challenge is that an in¯nite number of nested logit models could be speci¯ed to
represent the situation at hand, as any given city can be divided into geographical
areas in an in¯nite number of ways. In particular, if one choose to specify a nest
structure with a small number of large areas with many alternatives in each nest,
one are less likely to place GPs that are close substitutes in di®erent nests. On the
other hand, one is more likely to place GPs that are not close substitutes in the
same nest.
We now let the set of alternative GPs J be partitioned into K subsets denoted
B1;B2;:::;BK , j 2 Bk; k = 1;:::;K and refer to the K subsets as nests. The
utility consumer n obtains when selecting GP j in nest Bk is equal to the sum of
the deterministic and stochastic part of utility as expressed by (1). The nested logit















The parameter ¸k indicates the degree of independence in unobserved utility be-
tween alternatives within nest k. A higher value of ¸k indicates greater indepen-
dence and less correlation. When ¸k = 1 for all k, representing independence among
all the alternatives in all nests, the nested logit model reduces to the MNL model.
Testing the hypothesis ¸k = 1 for all k is thus a valid test for the appropriateness
of the MNL model.
33In this paper Vnj is speci¯ed as a linear function of observable variables:
Vnj = Xnj¯ + Zj°
where Xnj and Zj are vectors of explanatory variables and ¯ and ° are vectors of
the unknown parameters to be estimated. The latter parameters is assumed con-
stant across nests, GPs and decision makers and may be interpreted as marginal
utilities within the random utility framework. Xnj are explanatory variables inter-
acting characteristics of the GP j with characteristics of consumer n, and Zj are
explanatory variables describing characteristics or attributes of GP j. In contrast
with Xnj, Zj does not show any variation between decision makers, or in other






































We see that the Zj vector include area indicators such that znest
jk = 1 if GP j is part
of nest k. By estimating nest speci¯c constants one ensure that the probability of
choosing a GP within nest Bk is consistently estimated. Conditioned on Xnj;Zj,
the probability that consumer n choose GP i can be expressed as:
Pni = P(Vni + "ni > Vnj + "nj; 8i6=j) = P("nj < "ni + Vni ¡ Vnj; 8i6=j)
A property of the nested logit model is that we get closed form expressions for Pni.









¢¸l ; i;j 2 Bk; k;l = 1;:::;K
In the next section we present the results from a nested logit model where
K = 5, that is, Oslo is divided in ¯ve nests by using postal codes. The Norwegian
Mail Service refers to the two ¯rst digits in this code as the postal code region. In
34Oslo there are 12 di®erent postal code regions9: 01;02;03;:::;12. The postal code
region are used to de¯ne the ¯ve areas referred to as west, north, east1, east2,
and south. The decision makers' choice set is the complete set of GPs that where
actually available in Oslo when the regular GP scheme was implemented in June
2001, and all the decision makers are given identical choice sets. It should be noted
that specifying a rank ordered logit model (Beggs, Cardell and Hausman, 1981) and
utilizing the information on the alternatives ranked second and third was also con-
sidered. Although specifying such a model would allow us to extract more informa-
tion from the data, extracting more information seems super°uous in the situation
at hand.10 Further, rank ordered logit models are vulnerable to heteroscedasticity
(Hausman and Ruud, 1987) as choices of the alternatives with lower ranking are
made more randomly. We therefore proceed and estimate a nested logit model by
means of the maximum likelihood method available in the software STATA version
10.
5. Estimation and results
The results from nested logit regression are reported in Table 5. Most of the es-
timated coe±cients are statistically signi¯cant. The results con¯rm the result from
Lurº as (2003) that GPs with specialist status have, cet. par., higher probabilities
of being chosen than non-specialists. We also see that the estimated e®ect of the
variables GP born in Norway and marriedGP are positive.
From the estimated e®ects of ageGP (positive e®ect) and agedifference (neg-
ative e®ect) we can make the interesting interpretation that consumers indeed do
prefer GPs with similar age, but a GP who is older is preferred to a GP who
is younger than oneself. An alternative interpretation of this result is that older
GPs are preferred to younger GPs, and that the size of this positive e®ect of
GP age is stronger the older the patient. The estimated e®ect of genderff and
gendermm has the expected sign, supporting the idea that consumers prefer GPs
9We ignore the postal code region 00 which is reserved for special addresses such as the royal
castle.
10The author is also unaware of any standard software allowing for a nested speci¯cation of the
rank ordered model.
35Table 5: Results from nested logit estimation
No. of cases=14993. No. of Alternative GPs=437. Total No. of Obs. 6551941
Taxi Travel Model Car Travel Model
Regressor Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
Xnj variables
genderff 0.31 0.02** 0.27 0.02**
gendermm 0.65 0.03** 0.54 0.02**
agedifference -0.02 0.00** -0.02 0.00**
costs TAXI -0.18 0.00** -
costs CAR - -0.51 0.01**
Zj variables
specialist 0.16 0.02** 0.15 0.01**
GP born in Norway 0.18 0.02** 0.16 0.02**
marriedGP 0.21 0.02** 0.18 0.01**
ageGP 0.01 0.00** 0.01 0.00**
west (ref. cat.)
north -0.08 0.09 -0.19 0.09*
east1 -0.47 0.07** -0.33 0.07**
east2 -0.72 0.09** -0.70 0.08**
south -0.85 0.09** -0.56 0.08**
Dissimilarity parameters (¸k)
west 0.81 0.01** 0.72 0.01**
north 0.86 0.03** 0.76 0.02**
east1 0.86 0.01** 0.73 0.01**
east2 0.78 0.02** 0.67 0.02**
south 0.88 0.02** 0.69 0.02**
Log likelihood -68267.33 -68128.09
P-value LR test for IIA Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
(*) signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level (two tailed test)
(**) signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level (two tailed test)
with the same gender. It is also interesting to compare the di®erences in magni-
tude of male and female consumers' preferences for having a GP with the same
gender as expressed by the di®erence in the estimated e®ect of the two variables
genderff and gendermm. The results indicate that male consumers have stronger
(p-value <0.01) preferences for having a GP with the same gender as compared to
female consumers. We observe that the area dummies assigned to three of the city
areas have signi¯cantly negative e®ect on choice probabilities. The interpretation is
that a practice located in the reference category west is considered to be favorable
by consumers. At the bottom of the table we observe the estimated values of the so
called dissimilarity parameters referred to as ¸k. These parameters are in the range
36[0,1] in nested logit models that are consistent with random utility theory11. The
value of the dissimilarity parameters indicate the degree of intra nest correlation in
unobserved utility, where values close to one imply low correlation and small values
indicate high correlation. We see that the values of these parameters range from
0.78 (north) to 0.88 (south), indicating that there are signi¯cant correlation in
unobservable utility associated with alternatives within each nest. In the special
case where ¸k = 1 for all k, the nested logit model collapse to the MNL model. At
the very bottom of the table we see that the hypothesis that ¸k = 1 for all k is
rejected, supporting the choice of a less restrictive nested logit model.
An application: Estimating the willingness to pay for GP attributes
Table 6: WTP estimates high-cost and low cost alternatives
Model High-cost alternative: Taxi Low-cost alternative: Private Car
Variable WTP est. in e 95 % Conf. Int. WTP est. in e 95 % Conf. Int.
specialist 0.89 0.72 1.05 0.29 0.23 0.34
GP born in Norway 0.99 0.79 1.20 0.31 0.25 0.37
marriedGP 1.15 0.98 1.31 0.35 0.30 0.40
ageGP 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.03
genderff 1.71 1.50 1.93 0.53 0.47 0.60
gendermm 3.55 3.28 3.83 1.07 0.98 1.15
agedifference -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
The vectors ¯ and ° may be interpreted as marginal utilities. Having an es-
timate of the marginal utility associated with the travel costs, we may derive an
estimate of the willingness to pay for attributes of GPs. This approach is often
referred to as the travel cost method, a method more frequently used in environ-
mental economics (Parsons, 2003). By de¯nition, a decision maker's willingness
to pay for an attribute such as specialist status is the increase in travel costs that
keeps the decision maker's utility constant given that GP specialist status \change"
from non-specialist to specialist. As described in Train (2003, p 43) we may take
the total derivative of utility with respect to travel costs and specialist status and
11Dissimilarity parameters slightly larger than one are not necessarily inconsistent with random
utility theory. Dissimilarity parameters may never be negative, however. For discussions of
necessary and su±cient conditions for dissimilarity parameters to be consistent with random
utility theory consult BÄ orsch-Supan (1990) and Herriges and Kling (1996).
37set this derivative to zero as utility is kept constant:
¢ U = ° ¢ specialist+¯ ¢ travel costs= 0. Now we may solve for the







We note that the willingness to pay is positive as the cost coe±cient ° is negative.
In Table 6 we have computed the willingness to pay estimates by using (2). The
standard errors of these ratios, which are needed to calculate the con¯dence inter-
vals, are obtained by means of the delta method (Wikipedia contributors, 2009).
The disutility of the travel costs and the utility of the GP attributes is experi-
enced at each consultation, and hence, the estimates presented in Table 6 denotes
the willingness to pay per consultation. The willingness to pay estimates resulting
from the Taxi Travel Model are higher than the estimates from the Car Travel
Model. Still the willingness to pay for consulting a specialist in general practice
appear to be low. When travel costs are calculated by means of taxi prices, the
estimated willingness to pay for specialist status of a GP amounts to only e 0.89
per consultation, whereas the estimated willingness to pay for having a GP with
the same gender amounts to respectively e 1.71 and e 3.55 for female and male
decision makers, respectively.
6. Discussion and conclusion
The value or importance that decision makers attach to each attribute of the
alternatives will in general vary. A limitation of the speci¯ed logit model is that it
is unable to handle random taste variation. One might argue that some decision
makers possess poor information on the concept of the specialist status, and hence
that estimating the same ¯ and ° for all decision makers is a mis-speci¯cation.
Although random taste variation can be incorporated in mixed logit models, esti-
mation of such a model with the present choice set does not seem feasible due to
the heavy computational burden. Estimation of a mixed logit model would most
likely require a signi¯cant reduction in the number of alternatives. In this paper we
have handled some elements of taste variation, by taking account of the possibility
that GP attributes such as gender do not a®ect a male decision maker in the same
38way as a female decision maker, and by taking account of the fact that a young
patient may value high physician age di®erently than an elderly patient.
Some of the consumers may have chosen a GP located close to their workplace,
in order to combine everyday commuting with GP visits, and one may argue that
closeness to workplace should be included as a GP attribute. Multi-purpose trips
combining GP visits with commuting may imply that the computed travel costs are
slightly exaggerated for some of these consumers. However, the presented model
includes nest speci¯c constant terms in the speci¯cation of representative utility
implying that the choice probabilities, and the e®ects of travel costs, are identi¯ed
by within-nest-variation in variables, and one may argue that unobservable e®ects
such as \high density of work places" in certain areas are controlled for.
In order to assess the robustness of the estimated parameters and corresponding
estimates of willingness to pay, several alternative models have been estimated.
First, a model with 12 nests (K = 12) corresponding to the 12 postal code regions
was estimated, and the results were compared with the above results. None of
the estimated willingness to pay estimates were signi¯cantly di®erent from the
results presented here. The estimated dissimilarity parameters from the model
with 12 nests were quite di®erent, however: Several dissimilarity parameters were
signi¯cantly larger than one, suggesting that the model might be inconsistent with
random utility theory, hence the simple 5 nest model is presented in this paper.
Second, the presented model was also estimated applying a random sample that was
not corrected for endogenous sample selection. It is interesting to note that none
of the estimated coe±cients nor estimates of willingness to pay were statistically
di®erent. The implication of this result is that, even if there is evidence that
the share of the population who took active part in the GP choice process di®ers
from the share who remained passive, there is no evidence suggesting that their
preferences for attributes of GPs are di®erent.
There is evidence suggesting that consumers prefer GPs who resemble them-
selves on observable characteristics and it seems reasonable to conclude that the
consumer's choice of GP is not random. Our estimates of the willingness to pay for
consulting a specialist in general medicine seems to indicate that the willingness
to pay is quite low and lower than the extra fee specialists in general medicine
received at the time. An interpretation is thus that that the authorities' willing-
39ness to pay is higher than that of the patients. Several scenarios may lead to such
an outcome. One particular scenario that is consistent with the presented results
is one where the a higher consultation fee is motivated by specialists being closer
substitutes to secondary care, and further, that specialists are expected to have
lower referral rates compared to non-specialists. The specialist status is indeed
valued by patients, and even more so by the authorities because fewer referrals to
secondary care means lower health care costs. In other words we may not conclude
that the situation at hand is one where the supply of specialist consultations are
higher than what is socially optimal.
Since 2005, part of the extra fee specialists receive is paid by the patient, in the
form of a e 3.30 patient co-payment. Since this co-payment rate is higher than the
willingness to pay estimates presented here, an idea for future research would be to
examine whether the introduction of a patient co-payment for consulting specialists
in general medicine has a®ected the demand for the services of these specialists.
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42Appendix A:
Table A.1: Geographical representation of decision makers
Comparing the population means, with means from a random and a corrected sample
Postal Code Population random sample corrected sample
Participants only Participants only
Dummies N=401999 n=15000 n=15000
Mean Mean Mean
02** 0.081 0.077 0.076
03** 0.092 0.086 0.091
04** 0.101 0.098 0.101
05** 0.126 0.117 0.127
06** 0.161 0.171 0.168
07** 0.063 0.069 0.062
08** 0.040 0.042 0.036
09** 0.086 0.089 0.088
10** 0.055 0.049 0.052
11** 0.085 0.103 0.089
12** 0.054 0.056 0.055
43Table A.2: Results from Logit estimation
Estimating the probability of participating in the GP choice process. No. of obs. = 401999
Regressor Coeff. Est. Std. Err.
Female 0.670 0.008 **
Education1 0.093 0.063
Education2 0.060 0.047
Education3 0.265 0.047 **
Education4 0.339 0.047 **
Education5 0.340 0.052 **
Education6 0.478 0.047 **
Education7 0.518 0.048 **
Education8 0.526 0.062 **
Missingedu -0.554 0.049 **
Agecat2 0.229 0.010 **
Agecat3 0.614 0.012 **
Agecat4 0.889 0.013 **
Agecat5 1.224 0.017 **
Agecat6 1.065 0.016 **
Net Wealth
Decile1 -0.373 0.017 **
Decile2 -0.338 0.018 **
Decile3 -0.376 0.018 **
Decile4 -0.389 0.018 **
Decile5 -0.427 0.019 **
Decile6 -0.157 0.019 **
Decile7 0.006 0.019 **
Decile8 0.095 0.019 **
Decile9 0.096 0.019 **
Total Income
Decile1 -0.173 0.018 **
Decile2 -0.150 0.018 **
Decile3 0.005 0.018 **
Decile4 0.114 0.018 **
Decile5 0.219 0.018 **
Decile6 0.247 0.017 **
Decile7 0.266 0.017 **
Decile8 0.216 0.016 **
Decile9 0.150 0.016 **
Unemployd -0.376 0.012 **
cityarea2 0.261 0.019 **
cityarea3 0.221 0.018 **
cityarea4 0.279 0.018 **
cityarea5 0.206 0.017 **
cityarea6 0.464 0.017 **
cityarea7 0.464 0.021 **
cityarea8 0.591 0.024 **
cityarea9 0.498 0.019 **
cityarea10 0.548 0.021 **
cityarea11 0.730 0.020 **
cityarea12 0.711 0.021 **
europe -0.155 0.014 **
usacanada -0.175 0.043 **
africa -0.390 0.023 **
asia -0.108 0.015 **
oceania 0.022 0.144 **
southamerica -0.581 0.041 **
constant -0.556 0.053 **
Log likelihood -227485.91
Pseudo R2 0.0975
44Table A.3: Description of propensity score matching routine
Columns 1 and 4 records the estimated propensity score among non-participants in the random sample s with
15000 observations. Columns 2 and 5 reports the number of nonparticipants needed to be replaced. Columns 3
and 6 reports the number of matching candidates. We de¯ne a match when j^ ½np ¡ ^ ½pj < 0:01
^ ½np # to replace # matching candidates ^ ½np # to replace # matching candidates
.07 1 0* .52 118 2435
.10 1 10 .53 135 2475
.12 2 9 .54 99 2275
.13 1 20 .55 103 2319
.14 8 29 .56 134 2917
.15 3 30 .57 125 3214
.16 9 27 .58 117 3049
.17 7 63 .59 110 3322
.18 4 43 .60 128 3180
.19 6 55 .61 130 3293
.20 7 87 .62 114 4026
.21 12 95 .63 129 3873
.22 9 89 .64 107 3657
.23 20 118 .65 124 3915
.24 17 171 .66 124 4617
.25 17 127 .67 137 5144
.26 14 137 .68 137 5369
.27 29 215 .69 120 4678
.28 35 244 .70 100 4707
.29 28 236 .71 109 5906
.30 30 193 .72 122 6127
.31 34 282 .73 98 5654
.32 27 318 .74 103 5917
.33 30 431 .75 99 5810
.34 42 476 .76 114 7191
.35 54 511 .77 99 6383
.36 40 631 .78 87 6864
.37 51 621 .79 87 7095
.38 53 644 .80 128 8386
.39 48 744 .81 85 7354
.40 55 878 .82 72 7439
.41 61 995 .83 101 8715
.42 68 1159 .84 81 8059
.43 63 1136 .85 68 8034
.44 78 1125 .86 76 8579
.45 71 1226 .87 66 7627
.46 93 1602 .88 66 7097
.47 74 1577 .89 62 6696
.48 88 1762 .90 31 5084
.49 81 1753 .91 16 3867
.50 85 1955 .92 21 2718
.51 121 2376 .93 11 1247
* No match was found for the non-participant with propensity score 0.07. This particular observation was matched with a candidate
with a propensity score of 0.08.
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Asymmetric information between physicians and their patients is a basic characteristic
of the market for health care services. In the words of Arrow (1963):
\...medical knowledge is so complicated, the information possessed by the physician
as to the consequences and possibilities of treatment is necessarily very much greater
than that of the patient, or at least so it is believed by both parties".
Patients are therefore often considered to be poor judges of service quality. However,
those who have repeated encounters with the same health care provider, will accumulate
information on services and treatment outcomes, thus narrowing the information gap.
The market for general practitioners' services is characterized by durable doctor-patient
relations that may improve the patients' quality assessment. The aim of this paper is to
investigate empirically whether the demand facing a general practitioner (GP) responds
to the quality of the provided services.
General background
The impact of quality on the demand facing health care providers has important im-
plications for the organization of health care markets. There is a growing literature on
competition and quality in such markets, from which an important result is that the
e®ect of stronger competition on quality depends crucially on the relative sizes of the
price elasticity and the quality elasticity of demand. More competition may bring about
reductions in quality if the quality elasticity is small compared to the price elasticity
(Dranove and Satterthwaite, 2000, Gaynor, 2006). Further, the impact of quality on the
demand facing health care providers has important implications for the optimal design of
payment systems. A familiar result is that a retrospective payment scheme in the form of
cost reimbursement is likely to pursue the goal of quality provision while giving weak in-
centives to provide cost reducing e®orts. Conversely, prospective payment schemes tend
to strengthen the incentives for cost reduction, while weakening the incentives for provid-
ing quality. A combination of payment mechanisms is thus likely to perform better than
payment systems employing only one parameter. However, if quality a®ects demand, a
¯rst-best solution can, in theory, be obtained under a pure prospective payment scheme
(Ma, 1994). This suggests that the e®ect of quality on demand { and information on its
numerical size { is a key factor determining the optimal calibration of the parameters in
the payment system: If the market punishes providers who are skimping on quality, the
payment system can put more weight on the parameters that encourage cost reducing
e®orts.
Relation to literature
A conventional empirical approach when seeking to assess the e®ect of quality on demand
for health care services is to estimate the e®ect of provider characteristics on individual
47consumers' choice of provider, applying di®erent models for individuals' discrete choice.
An in°uential paper in this tradition is Luft et al. (1990). They speci¯cally study the
e®ect of quality indicators such as death and complication rates, teaching status of hos-
pital, and out of state admissions on patients' choice of hospital, using logit models, and
¯nd positive e®ects for several of the applied indicators. Using similar quality indicators
and methods, Burns and Wholey (1992) extend the framework by including in their logit
models characteristics of the admitting physician. They ¯nd that quality a®ects demand
positively, and that characteristics of the admitting physician are important determinants
of patients' hospital choice. More recently, Howard (2005), applying a mixed logit model
on data on kidney transplantations, estimated the e®ect of the deviation from expected
failure rate on probabilities of hospital choice. The results indicate that hospitals with
a higher than expected failure rate have smaller probabilities for being chosen. A di®er-
ent empirical strategy is followed in Chirikos (1992), in estimating, by linear regression,
the e®ect of individual hospitals' quality spending on their market shares. The results
support the hypothesis that increased provider quality a®ects demand positively.
The present paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, no previous empirical
studies seem to have considered the demand e®ects of quality in the market for general
practitioners. Second, in the current literature the relationship between demand and
various indicators of quality, such as mortality rates, failure rates or hospital type, and
other independent variables, are estimated separately. The present paper contributes
to the literature by simultaneously estimating the relationship between demand and
quality and the way in which quality becomes manifest via indicators, applying linear
structural equation modeling (LISREL) and estimation methods. Taking this approach,
we acknowledge both the multidimensional aspect of the quality concept, and that it
may be considered as more appropriate to interpret outcome measures such as mortality
rates or failure rates as indicators of quality, rather than as direct measures of quality
itself. Third, our econometric model provides a method to separate the e®ect of quality
on outcome measures from the e®ect of patient health.
Setting of the study
In June 2001 a regular GP scheme was introduced in Norwegian general practice, making
the GPs responsible for the provision of primary care services to the persons listed at
their practice. Prior to the reform the health authorities gathered the information needed
to assign one GP to each Norwegian inhabitant. All inhabitants were asked to rank their
three most preferred GPs in a form, and all GPs were asked to report the maximum
number of patients they would like to take care of. An algorithm was designed to utilize
this information and obtain a one-to-one match between inhabitants and GPs.
Our data set has a panel format with the GP as the observation unit, but for some
variables only one observation per GP exists. The data stem from The Norwegian General
Practitioners Database, covering all Norwegian GPs, supplemented by measures of the
48GP density in each municipality and of age-gender speci¯c mortality rates. Among
the variables recorded are the number of persons who ranked each GP as most preferred
when returning the entry form, the number of mortalities among each GP's listed patients
during a six-month period, and the proportion of the listed persons who switch to other
GPs in later periods. For a strati¯ed sample of GPs, relating to 14 municipalities, from
this o±cial GP database the data set has been extended to also include the median income
and wealth of the listed persons and the proportion of them who have not ¯nished high-
school. In the analysis, we interpret the number of ¯rst-rankings and the proportion of
listed persons who switch to other GPs, as indicators of the demand facing each GP.
Our main hypothesis is that there exists a latent stochastic variable, denoted as GP
quality, which, when heterogeneity related to the health status of the listed persons and
other observed heterogeneity have been accounted for, is positively related to the demand
facing each individual GP and negatively related to the recorded excess mortality of the
GP's listed patients. We ¯nd empirical support to this hypothesis.
Two kinds of models are considered: a panel data model with latent heterogeneity
related to GP quality and a multi-equation LISREL type of model, including both GP
quality and the health of the stock of persons on the GP's list as latent variables, both
of which are assumed to a®ect demand as well as other observed variables. For some
variables, including the proportion of persons switching and the excess mortality, we have
data in the panel data format. This is pro¯table for quantifying the latent heterogeneity
and its consequences.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The modeling of the demand in the market
for GPs is discussed in the following two sections. In Section 2, we present a theoretical
argument supporting the view that the expected demand facing each individual GP can
be a function of quality, even if the true quality is unobserved to potential patients. This
motivates testable predictions and hypotheses to be examined in the paper. In Section 3,
we present the two econometric models. The data are described in Section 4, while
estimation and test results are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss the results
and conclude.
2 Some theory: Quality and demand
Since consumers are imperfectly informed about the quality of GPs, we distinguish be-
tween true and perceived quality. In order to understand how individuals' perceptions of
quality of available providers can form the basis for the demand facing the providers we
may turn to the literature on probabilistic choice models, cf. McFadden (1981).
Let ¹j denote the true quality of GP j (j = 1;:::;M), while qij denotes the quality
of GP j as perceived by consumer i (i = 1;:::;N). The relation between true and
perceived quality may be expressed as qij = ¹j + uij where uij denotes a noise term or
measurement error. Conditional on ¹j, the probability that consumer n chooses GP i
49can now be expressed as:
Pni = P(¹i + uni > ¹j + unj; 8i6=j) = P(unj < uni + ¹i ¡ ¹j; 8i6=j)
Di®erent assumptions for the noise terms uij lead to di®erent types of choice models.
Assuming that the uij terms are independent, and follow an extreme value type 1 dis-
tribution, will result in choice probabilities consistent with a logit type model. In that
case we get the well known closed form expressions for Pni, given by: Pni = e¹i P
k e
¹k , cf.
Train (2003, p. 78). In this simple model the demand facing provider i may be expressed
as NPni. We have the following predictions from this simple theory:
[P1] GPs with high quality of services have a higher probability of being selected by a represen-
tative consumer than a GP whose services are of lower quality.
[P2] The selection probabilities Pni are independent of the number of consumers, N. For a given
population of M GPs, expected demand for the services of any of them, is a linear function of N.
This simple model may be generalized an extended in many ways. In particular, one
may argue that consumers are able to a®ect the precision of their own quality assessment.
If some consumers are more skillful or eager in gathering and processing information in
the market than others, the result will be heteroskedasticity in the uij terms: Relaxing
the homoskedasticity assumption of uij , denoting instead the variance of uij by ¾2
ij, this
could have been accounted for by allowing for ¾2
ij <¾2
hj if consumer i has taken e®orts to
become better informed about GP j's quality than has consumer h. A prediction from
such an extended model is that high-quality GPs tend to have a higher proportion of
skilled or eager consumers on their lists than low-quality GPs. The possible existence of
such a selection mechanism is important since consumers who are skilled or eager in col-
lecting information, may have a health status and a death probability di®erent from those
not so skilled or eager. The crucial question then becomes: which groups of consumers,
according to observable characteristics, devote most attention and e®orts in searching
for the best GP? On the one hand, less healthy consumers, with a high expected mor-
tality rate, may be thought to be particularly concerned about their choice of GP and
as a result be more willing to collect information than the average consumer. This may
contribute to increasing the average mortality rate among the patients listed with high-
quality GPs. On the other hand, consumers who are more healthy and resourceful and
have low expected mortality may be particularly able to collect and process such infor-
mation. This may contribute to the outcome of the selection mechanism being reversed,
i.e., lowering the average mortality rates of the persons listed with high-quality GPs.
Consequently, from a priori reasoning it is not obvious that the outcome of (observed or
unobserved) patient heterogeneity will be neither that high-quality GPs attract patients
with an average health status which di®ers from that of the low-quality GPs, nor if there
is a di®erence, in which direction it will go. If a mechanism systematically selecting
patients with di®erent expected mortality rates for GPs of di®erent professional quality
is at work, and heterogeneity in health status among listed patients is given insu±cient
50attention in our modelling, we are likely to face severe di±culties when trying to estimate
the impact on demand of GP service quality. The models to be described below have
di®erent degree of sophistication and are not equally well designed to meet this challenge.
We address this issue in more detail in sections 3 and 5.
3 Econometric models
Motivation
In order to represent, and hopefully quantify, how the demand for GP services responds
to GP quality and other relevant variables { as motivated by the theoretical argument put
forth in the previous section { two kinds of models will be considered. The ¯rst, Model A,
is a two-equation panel data model accounting for latent unit-speci¯c heterogeneity. We
associate the latter with, inter alia, perceived GP quality. The second, Model B, is a
more complex, multi-equation model of the LISREL type. It includes not only GP quality
among its latent variables, but also the initial health status of the persons entered on the
GPs' lists. This extension serves to control for the fact that GP quality and observed GP
heterogeneity may interact with observed and latent heterogeneity of the listed persons
in multiple ways when determining demand as observed in the market.
Model A: Two-equation panel data random e®ects regression model
Assume that, in a certain district, at time t, there are Mt GPs, indexed by, j = 1;:::;Mt,
and Nt patients, indexed by i = 1;:::;Nt. As before, we let ¹j denote the true quality of
GP j, unobserved both to the consumers and the health administrators, and now treated
as stochastic. Let further y1jt and y2jt denote two observable variables, which may be
considered indicators of ¹j at time t. The interpretation adopted in Model A is that y1jt
is the demand facing GP j, and y2jt is the excess death rate of persons on the list of
this GP at time t. We speci¯cally measure demand only by the number of consumers
ranking the GP as the most strongly preferred prior to the implementation of the regular
GP reform, and it is observed in period t = 1 only. The variables assumed to explain
(y1j1;y2jt) are quality and observable variables, of which some vary across both GPs and
time periods, denoted as two-dimensional variables, and some are GP-speci¯c.
We specify
y1j1 = x1j1¯1 + z1j°1 + ®1j + u1j1; j = 1;:::;M1;























where (x1j1;x2jt) and (z1j; z2j) are the row vectors of two-dimensional and GP-speci¯c
variables, respectively, ¯1;°1;¯2;°2 are column vectors of coe±cients, and (®1j;®2j) are
stochastic latent variables relating to the GP j's quality, the latter assumed to a®ect
51patients' demand as well as their mortality. A crucial part of the model are the equa-
tions which connect these latent variables with the latent quality ¹j. We consider two
ways of formalizing this relationship stochastically, denoted as Versions 1 and 2. In both
versions, parallel with the extended scope of the model, the statistical status of ¹j will
be changed from being a deterministic expectation, interpreted conditionally, to being a
latent stochastic variable, the distribution of which is a speci¯c part of the econometric
panel data model.
Latent heterogeneity. Version 1: We ¯rst specify
®1j = ¸1¹j + "1j;




































where we expect ¸1>0, ¸2<0, and ¾"1"2 = ¾"2"1 < 0. When ¹j is low, i.e., when GP j is
a low-quality doctor, then his/her patients will have a higher mortality rate than can be
explained by (x2jt;z2j), and he/she will meet a lower demand than can be explained by
(x1j1;z1j). Equations (1) and (3) de¯ne a four-equation system of structural equations
explaining (y1j1;y2jt;®1j;®2j) by (x1j1;x2jt;z1j;z2j;¹j) and noise terms. Inserting (3)
into (1) yields the reduced form
(5)
y1j1 = x1j1¯1 + z1j°1 + ¸1¹j + "1j + u1j1; j = 1;:::;M1;
y2jt = x2jt¯2 + z2j°2 + ¸2¹j + "2j + u2jt; j = 1;:::;Mt; t = 1;:::;T;
Latent heterogeneity. Version 2: The alternative version is
























where we expect ¸<0. Equations (1) and (6) de¯ne a three-equation system of structural
equations which explains (y1j1;y2jt;®1j) by (x1j1;x2jt;z1j;z2j;®2j) and noise terms. In-
serting (6) into (1) we get, instead of (5), the reduced form
(8)
y1j1 = x1j1¯1 + z1j°1 + ¸®2j + "j + u1j1; j = 1;:::;M1;
y2jt = x2jt¯2 + z2j°2 + ®2j + u2jt; j = 1;:::;Mt; t = 1;:::;T:
The latter equations, with ¸ = ¸1=¸2 and "j = "1j ¡ ¸"2j, could, of course, alternatively
have been derived from (1) and (3). However, if (4) were assumed to hold, (8) would
not be a reduced form, since ®2j is correlated with "2j and therefore with "j +u1j1. The
empirical implementation of Model A, to be presented in Section 5, relies on Version 2,
in that estimation is done sequentially and a predicted value of ®2j obtained from the
second equation in (8), the excess mortality equation, serves as a proxy for GP quality
in the ¯rst equation, the demand equation. The estimators used in Section 5 will thus be
consistent, but they would have been inconsistent if (4) were the valid stochastic process.
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Model A gives a rather restrictive, uni-directional description of how demand for GP ser-
vices is related to GP quality. A LISREL model [see Goldberger (1972), JÄ oreskog (1977),
Aigner et al. (1984, Sections 4 and 5), and JÄ oreskog et al. (2000)], may be a better
solution to the problem of modeling sample separation. Model B belongs to this class.
Again, we exploit the panel design of our data set, with the GP as the observational
unit, containing GP-speci¯c time-series for some variables, including patient-switching
and mortality rates, as well as GP-speci¯c and patient speci¯c time invariant variables.
We let t be the time index and suppress the GP subscript. Boldface and slim let-
ters denote matrices/vectors and scalars, respectively. Model B has three categories of
variables: observable (manifest) structural variables, latent structural variables, and er-
ror/noise variables. The categorization is as follows:
Observable (manifest) structural variables:
y1: Number of persons wanting to be entered on list initially, in period 1 (scalar)
y2t: Number of persons switching to another GP in period t (scalar)
x1: Observed GP characteristics initially, in period 1 [(6£1)-vector]
x2: Observed patient characteristics initially, in period 1 [(3£1)-vector]
x3t: Excess mortality of patient stock in period t (scalar)




´: Demand directed towards GP (latent, time-invariant scalar)
»1: GP quality (latent, time-invariant scalar)
»2: Patient health (latent, time-invariant scalar)
Error/noise variables:
³: Disturbance in demand function
"1;"2t: Errors in the measurement equations for demand
±1: Errors in equations relating GP quality to GP characteristics [(6£1)-vector]
±2: Errors in equations relating patient health to patient characteristics. [(3£1)-vector]
±3t: Errors in equations relating patient health and GP quality to excess mortality (scalar)
±3 ´ [±31;:::;±3T]0
"2 ´ ["21;:::;"2T]0
A basic hypothesis of Model B is that GP quality, »1, and patient health status, »2 are
exogenous to the rest of the system. The quality variable »1 corresponds to ¹j in Model A,
Version 1. Time invariance and exogeneity are also assumed for the time invariant GP
characteristics, x4, represented by the gender and the country of origin of the GP. These
four variables are considered as determined from outside, inherent in the GP and in
the patient, and hence not subjected to feedback from the rest of the system. This is
an important assumption, which, for at least »1 and »2, may be questioned. To some
extent it will be modi¯ed later on (Section 5), in examining the robustness of the primary
53conclusions concerning the link between GP quality and patient demand to changes in
basic assumptions. These genuinely exogenous variables are, in Model B, indicated by
observable `counterparts', which, by assumption, become endogenous.
The model has four elements: (i) a demand function for GP services expressed in
terms of latent variables, (ii) measurement equations indicating this latent demand,
(iii) measurement equations indicating GP quality and health status of listed persons, and
(iv) distributional assumptions for the latent exogenous variables and the error terms.
First, the demand function, relating latent demand (endogenous) to GP quality (ex-
ogenous) and latent health status and other characteristics of the listed persons (all
exogenous), is:








We can interpret ¡11;¡12;¡14 as (vectors of) structural coe±cients and ³ as a disturbance.

















This subsystem expresses that y1;y21;:::;y2T are treated as T+1 observable indicators
of the latent demand for GP services. Technically, in factor-analytic terminology, we
can interpret ¤Y 1 and ¤Y 2 as factor loadings for, respectively, the number of persons
wanting to be on the list initially (positive loading) and the number of persons switching
to another GP in a later period (negative loading), on latent demand. In standard
regression terminology, we can interpret ¤Y 1 and ¤Y 2 as the marginal e®ects of the
latent variables on the corresponding observable variables. The error terms ("1;"2) may
contain measurement errors. Third, the measurement system for GP quality and patient


































This subsystem expresses that the vector of observed GP characteristics, x1, is related
to latent GP quality, that the vector of observed patient characteristics is related to
latent patient health, and that the T vector of excess mortalities, x3, is related to both
GP quality and patient health. Technically, in factor-analytic terminology, ¤X11;¤X31
can be interpreted as, respectively, factor loadings for GP characteristics and excess
patient mortality on latent GP quality. Likewise, ¤X22;¤X32 can be interpreted as
factor loadings for, respectively, patient characteristics and excess patient mortality on
patient health. The error terms (±1;±2;±3) may contain measurement errors.
54Fourth, the process determining the latent exogenous variables »1;»2 is modeled in






















while the distributions of the error and noise terms are assumed to satisfy












































































The ¯nal assumption, (16), where ? denotes orthogonal, expresses, inter alia, the
assumed exogeneity for GP quality and patient health. Its essence is that these variables,
being modeled by (12), remain una®ected by the perturbations in the demand equation
disturbances, and the errors in the measurement systems for demand (endogenous) and
latent GP quality and latent patient health (exogenous). Since arguments may be raised
that this model disregards a possible e®ect of GP quality on the listed patients' initial
health status, we will in addition consider a modi¯ed version, Model C, in which this
potential link is modeled and hence may be tested for.
4 Data
Data sources and data design
Prior to the introduction of the regular GP scheme in June 2001, the health authorities
gathered the information needed to assign GPs to the entire Norwegian population. All
inhabitants were asked to rank their three most preferred GPs in an entry form. The
GPs were asked to report the maximum number of patients they would like to take care
of. The health authorities utilized this information as an input in an algorithm allocating
inhabitants to GPs. Most people got listed with the GP whom they had consulted prior
to the reform (Lurº as, et al., 2003).
Our data stem from The Norwegian General Practitioners Database supplemented
by a measure of the GP density, as calculated from the number of contracted GPs in
each municipality in June 2001, as well as aggregate age/gender speci¯c mortality rates.
55The latter are calculated by means of aggregate mortality rates constructed by Statistics
Norway. The Norwegian General Practitioners Database contains information on all
Norwegian GPs, and the variables describing the individual GPs practice is provided
by the National Insurance Administration (NIA) every six month. The database is
administered by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, who merge the information
reported by NIA with socio-demographic variables as income, wealth and marital status,
registered by statistics Norway. For GPs practicing in 14 municipalities, sampled by
strati¯cation, the database also includes characteristics for the patients who were listed
in the GP's practice in June 2001, such as the median income and median wealth, and
the proportion who have not ¯nished high-school. For each GP we know the number
of persons who ranked the GP at the top when returning the entry form, in this paper
to be given the interpretation as an indicator of the demand facing the GP. After the
reform was implemented, the GP database is updated at regular intervals to give the
number of persons who are actually listed in the practice. After excluding observations
with key variables missing, our unbalanced panel data set consists of a sample of 484 GPs
observed up to 7 six-month periods.1 The pattern of observation is described in Table 1,
from which we see that 441, or 91 %, of the GPs are observed in all 7 periods.
Table 2 lists and de¯nes the variables applied in this paper, Table 3 gives overall
descriptive statistics for the variables, and Table 4 gives descriptive statistics of the GP-
speci¯c means of the time varying variables. Descriptive statistics for variables at the
level of the municipality are given in Table 5. We distinguish between variables observed
at the GP level and variables which are observed at the municipality level and hence are
common to all GPs practising in the same municipality.
The symbols used for the observable variables in the exposition of Models A and B
above, (x;y;z), have their empirical counterparts among the the variables in Table 2.






























































1The GPs from the municipality Troms¿, 44 in total, were excluded from the sample. Here, the regular
GP scheme was implemented already in 1993 and very few inhabitants returned the entry form.
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Variables at the GP level, including patient stock characteristics
The variables collected at the GP level and related to the mortality of the persons on
the GP's list are DEAD, EXPDEAD, ACTMORT, EXPMORT, and EXCMORT. The number of
individuals leaving the list and the number of mortalities on each individual GP's list
during a six-month period is registered in the GP database, except for the year 2002,
where this information is registered for the whole calendar year only. We have allocated
the mortalities and the switches in this year on the two half-years, according to the list
sizes in the two half-years. DEAD denotes the number of mortalities during a period, and
ACTMORT measures mortality per thousand listed patients.
GPs with a relatively high proportion of elderly people on their lists are presumably
recorded with a relatively high mortality rate in any period. In order to compensate for
this heterogeneity when measuring excess mortality, we proceeded as follows: Among the
information registered in the GP database is the number of listed males and females be-
longing to each of the age categories 0{7, 8{19, 20{29, 30{39, 40{49, 50{59, 60{69, 70{79
years, and 80 years and above. By applying the gender and the age speci¯c death proba-
bilities (Statistics Norway, 2005a) and the age distribution in Norway (Statistics Norway,
2005b), we can for each GP calculate the expected number of mortalities, EXPDEAD, and
the expected per thousand mortality rate, EXPMORT, i.e., EXPDEAD per thousand listed
persons. This enables us to calculate EXCMORT: the di®erence between the actual and the
expected mortality rates at the GP level, henceforth to be referred to as the GP-speci¯c
excess mortality rate
From Table 3 we see that the overall mean of the actual number of mortalities during a
six-month period (DEAD) is 5.63, and from Table 4 that its GP-speci¯c mean ranges from
0 to 22 mortalities. The overall mean of the expected number of mortalities (EXPDEAD)
is 5.12, with range from 0.05 to 23.9. By combining the aggregate death probabilities
and the age-gender distribution of listed patients we have obtained a two-dimensional
variable, with a mean value not far from the actual mean number of deaths according to
the mortality statistics included in the General Practitioners Database.
57The overall mean number of mortalities per thousand listed persons is 4.76. Its GP-
speci¯c means range from zero to 28. EXPMORT has an overall mean of 4.24 deaths per
thousand, and the GP-speci¯c means ranges from 0.45 to 12.45. An important variable
in the analyses is the excess mortality rate, EXCMORT. As explained, a positive (negative)
value means that the mortality rate at the GP level is higher (lower) than expected from
the age and gender distribution of the persons on each GP's list. We note that the overall
mean of EXCMORT is positive. The reason for this could be, on the one hand that the
mortality tables are constructed from cross-sectional variation in mortalities during a
period of only one year, on the other hand that life expectancy is known to be lower than
the national average in the municipality Oslo (Statistics Norway, 2006a & 2006b), which
is the location of 426 of the 484 GPs in the data set. A third explanation may be that
the number of deaths in the ¯rst period is somewhat overestimated.2
We denote the number of consumers ranking a speci¯c GP as most preferred as
DEMAND directed towards this GP. It is time-invariant, as the matching of GPs and
patients has been undertaken only once, in 2001, when implementing the regular GP
reform. The average GP was preferred by 826 inhabitants, but there is a lot of variation.
The most popular GP in our data set was preferred by 3152 inhabitants, whereas some
GPs were not preferred by any. Being requested by a large number of inhabitants in
a municipality with a high GP density is not equivalent to be strongly requested in a
municipality where the GP density is low. We have considered two ways of controlling for
di®erences in GP density across municipalities. The primary one is to include a measure
of GP density as an additional explanatory variable representing observed heterogeneity.
The secondary one is to weight DEMAND by a measure of GP density. The speci¯c
measure of the GP density applied here is the number of GPs per thousand inhabitants
in the municipality (GPDENSITY); see the next sub-section for an elaboration. The speci¯c
measure of weighted demand we used is the variables DEMAND1, obtained as the product
of DEMAND and GPDENSITY. Taking DEMAND1 as the relevant demand variable in our
analysis implies that a given number of ¯rst rankings is interpreted as a higher demand
in a municipality with a high GP density than in a municipality where GP density is low.
Prediction [P2] provides the rationale for transforming the demand variable in this way.
We have information on the number of persons leaving a GP's list in order to enroll
on a competitor's list.3 We refer to the proportion of listed persons leaving the list and
2The period-speci¯c means of ACTMORT seem to be higher in the ¯rst period than in the later
periods. This is not unexpected as the ¯rst period is one month longer, a fact we have adjusted for
simply by multiplying the number of mortalities in the ¯rst period with
6
7. We suspect that mortalities
in the period April to June 2001 may also have been registered, although with a lag. In estimating
the models, we have therefore alternatively applied an adjustment factor of
6
9, which would have been
correct if mortalities from April to June 2001 were indeed included among those registered for the second
half-year 2001. The main results are not a®ected by this modi¯cation of the adjustment factor.
3Patients leaving the list because they migrate or move to another municipality are excluded from
these numbers. We thus interpret LEAKRATE as the proportion of the listed persons who switch because
they actually prefer another GP.
58switching to other GPs in the municipality as LEAKRATE, and interpret this variable as
a time-varying indicator of the demand. Its overall mean is 3%, its GP-speci¯c means
vary from close to zero to 27%, and the between GP variation accounts for as much as
90% of the total variation.
Our data set also reports the GP's age (AGEGP), gender (FEMALEGP), and marital
status (MARRIEDGP) as well as the GP's birth country. We see that the average GP is
47 years old, that 36% of the GPs are females and that 69% are married. We have con-
structed a binary variable, IMMIGRGP, equal to 1 if the GP is born in a non-Scandinavian
country. About 5% of the GPs in our sample have this property. The variable denoted
SALARY is a binary variable equal to one if the GP is remunerated by means of a ¯xed
salary contract when practicing as a GP, and we see that 5% of the GPs have this kind
of contract.
The number of patients actually listed in the practice at the beginning and end of
each period is registered in the GP database. To take account of within-period changes
of this variable, we construct the average of the numbers recorded at the beginning and
at the end of each period, giving the variable LISTSIZE. Its overall mean is 1211 persons,
while its GP-speci¯c means range from 153 to 2620.
Our data set also reports whether the GP is a specialist in general medicine (dummy
variable SPECGEN), in community medicine (dummy variable SPECCOM) or in another
medical ¯eld (dummy variable SPECOTH) { all of which are time-varying, but the within-
GP variation is small. Overall, 56% of the GPs are specialists in general medicine, 7%
are specialists in community medicine. and 3% are specialists in an other ¯eld.
Our GP-level data also contain the following information on the patients who were
listed in the practice in June 2001: the median net income and median net wealth among
the listed patients older than 30 years, the proportion of listed patients who are older
than 30 and have not ¯nished high school and the proportion of the listed patients who
submitted the entry form signalling GP preferences. By construction, these variables
are uni-dimensional, as this information is not updated after the implementation of the
regular General Practitioner Scheme. The income and wealth variables, measured in
1.000 NOK, PINCOME and PWEALTH, have overall means 196.5 and 63.4, respectively.
Not unexpectedly, they vary considerably: the GP whose listed patients are on average
richest, have a median income twice that of the GP whose listed patients have the lowest
median income. The corresponding median wealth, PWEALTH extends from ¡94:2 to
467.3. In the LISREL analysis, after some trial runs, we decided to exclude PWEALTH
from the variable list, in order to ensure convergence. We suspect that the reason for
this is that income and wealth are highly correlated.
Finally, PFORMSUB denotes the proportion of the listed patients who submitted the
entry form prior to the implementation of the regular General Practitioner Scheme. This
variable varies from nearly zero to one, indicating that some GPs were not assigned any
patients who submitted the entry form, while other GPs were assigned only patients who
submitted the form. The mean of this variable is 0.73, indicating that the average GP
59have a list where 73% of the patients submitted the entry form. We denote by PEDUC
the proportion of the listed patients who are older than 30 and have not ¯nished high
school. We see that the average GP have 45% of the listed patients characterized by not
having ¯nished high school. This share also varies considerably, from 2% to 81%.
Variables at the level of the municipality
Some important variables reported are speci¯c to the municipality in which the practice of
the GP is localized. Statistics Norway has constructed an indicator of centrality, placing
each Norwegian municipality in one of 4 centrality categories. This indicator captures,
inter alia, the population density and the distance to the nearest city of a certain size. We
refer to these categories, in an order of increasing centrality, as least central (LEASTCENT),
less central (LESSCENT), central (CENTRAL) and most central (MOSTCENT). In our sample
six municipalities are categorized as least central municipalities, one as being less central,
three municipalities as being central, while three municipalities are categorized as most
central. A description of the GP density measure, GPDENSITY, and the number of GPs
within each municipality are given in Table 5. We see that the range of GPDENSITY is
from 0.55 to 1.57 GPs per thousand inhabitants.
5 Estimation and test results
Our data set include several variables expected to be related to the individual quality of
the GP, primarily the demand variable DEMAND and excess mortality variable EXCMORT.
It is important to note that information on the number of patient mortalities at the level
of the GP is not publicly available in Norway. It is thus highly unlikely that individuals'
choice of GP is directly related to these numbers. We derived from our theoretical model
in Section 2, the prediction, [P1], that a positive relationship exists between the quality
of the individual GP and the demand facing the GP, even when individual consumers
may have incorrect perceptions of GP quality. How perceptions are formed is unknown
and we make no attempt to open this \black box", as an enquiry into the formation of
human perceptions is beyond the scope of this paper. We let consumers be heterogeneous
with regard to their preferences, the information they possess, and the way they process
information. Consumers may choose the same GP for di®erent reasons, or di®erent GPs
for the same reason. We expect however that the GPs' appearance, experiences from
earlier consultations with available GPs, advice from relatives and friends and even rumor
to enter the \black box" as inputs in the formation of individuals' quality perceptions.
As explained in Sections 3 and 4, the statistical modeling of the `causality chain' giving
rise to this relationship is rather di®erent in the two econometric models we consider,
Model A and Model B. In addition, mainly as a robustness check of our main conclusion,
results obtained from a third model, Model C { essentially a modi¯cation of Model B in
one important respect { will be brie°y considered at the end.
60The estimation procedure for Model A, Version 2, represented by Equation (8), is,
as explained in Section 3, a stepwise procedure. Using in both steps modules in the
STATA 9 software, we estimate in the ¯rst step the e®ect of the variables representing
observed heterogeneity and other assumed exogenous variables on the mortality rates and
extract the predicted value of the random e®ect for each GP in the sample, ALPHAHAT.4
In estimating this mortality equation, i.e., the second equation of (8), we allow for the
possibility that the residuals are not independent within municipalities, and report robust
standard errors. In the second step, this prediction, treated as an exogenous variable, is
inserted in the demand equation, i.e., the ¯rst equation of (8).5
For the multi-equation model, Model B, we apply the Maximum Likelihood (ML)
procedure in the LISREL 8.80 software.6 The actual number of linear equations to be
simultaneously estimated is 25. In this model both the quality of the individual GPs and
the unobserved aggregate health status of the listed patients occur as latent exogenous
variables, as explained in Section 3.
Results for Model A
The mortality equation
The dependent variable in this equation is ACTMORT. Observable heterogeneity is con-
trolled for in various ways. First, to control for di®erences in the age and gender dis-
tribution of the GPs' listed patients, we include the expected mortality rates EXPMORT
as an explanatory variable. Second, to account for heterogeneity between municipali-
ties of di®erent centrality, we include the centrality dummies LEASTCENT, LESSCENT and
CENTRAL. Third, to account for observable GP heterogeneity we include AGEGP, three
GP speciality dummies as well as FEMALEGP. Fourth, we include variables describing the
listed patients, with intention to control for the possibility that the average health status
of patients varies between GPs. Since there is evidence in the medical literature that
life expectancy and health status is related to education, income and wealth (Lantz et
al., 1998, Papas et al., 1993), we include PEDUC, PINCOME and PWEALTH as proxies for the
average health status of the persons listed with each GP. Fifth, as discussed in Section 2,
still another kind of heterogeneity may also occur: individuals who chose not to submit
the entry form stating their preferences for certain GPs, may have an average health
4See Hsiao (2003, Section 6.2.2.c) and Lee and Gri±ths (1979) on the prediction of random e®ects
from panel data.
5An even simpler alternative also considered is a single-equation model where the excess mortality
rate is inserted directly as a quality indicator in the demand equation { in a sense merging the two
equations in (8) into one equation. The underlying assumption is that the GP speci¯c level of patient
excess mortality is exogenous. This approach, however, is defective to the extent that the GPs have an
inhomogeneous patient stock with respect to the average health status, which will induce a bias in the
coe±cient estimate of the quality variable. The results from this `single-equation version' of Model A is
presented in Appendix A, Table A.1
6The Covariances and Means to be analyzed are estimated by the EM procedure, as there are some
missing observations due to the unbalanced panel data.
61status di®erent from those who returned the entry form. We take account of this by in-
cluding PFORMSUB as an explanatory variable. Since the range of PEDUC and PFORMSUB
is restricted to the (0;1) interval, we transform them by the log-odds using the formula
ln( x
1¡x) in order to extend their range to (¡1;+1) which gives a better balance with
the unbounded range of the other explanatory variables.
The results from the mortality equation are presented in Table 6. All of the es-
timated coe±cients except LEASTCENT, SPECGEN, AGEGP and AGEGPSQ are statistically
signi¯cant, and the overall R2 is rather high: 0.5071. The coe±cient of EXPMORT is pos-
itive, as expected, since high expected mortality should have a positive e®ect on actual
mortality. Further, GPs having their practice in a central or less central municipality
have a signi¯cantly lower patient mortality rate than GPs in most central municipalities.
The negative estimated coe±cient of LOSUBMIT indicates that GPs who were assigned
a high proportion of the persons who expressed their GP preferences in advance, have
lower patient mortality than GPs who obtained a low proportion of patients who actively
selected their GP. The coe±cient on the education variable is negative, which is not in ac-
cordance with intuition saying that GPs with a high proportion of low-educated patients
have a higher mortality rate and may be attributed to education being correlated with
income and wealth.7 The estimated coe±cients of income and wealth have the expected
negative signs. Since these variables are measured in 1000 NOK, an increase in PINCOME
and PWEALTH of NOK 100:000 would be accompanied by a reduction in the mortality
rates of 0.97 and 0.94 deaths per thousand, respectively. We see that, ceteris paribus, the
patient mortality rate of GPs who are specialists in community medicine is signi¯cantly
higher and that of GPs who are specialists in a ¯eld other than general medicine and
community medicine is signi¯cantly lower than the patient mortality rate of other GPs.
Finally, female GPs have, ceteris paribus, a lower mortality rate of their patient stock
than male GPs.
Statistics describing the predicted values of the GP speci¯c heterogeneity variables,
i.e., of the ®2js obtained from the second equation of (8), denoted as ALPHAHAT, are
given at the head of Table 7. According to our interpretation of Model A, ®2j represents
a latent variable that is linearly related to quality, confer Equations (3) and (6). A
histogram is given in Figure 1. Its form is not very far from a bell-shape, although with
an outlier at the right end, equal to 13.11 deaths per thousand.
We next proceed to consider the results for the demand equations, in which the AL-
PHAHAT predictions are among its explanatory variables.
The demand equation
The estimation results for the demand equation, in the two versions explained above, are
presented in Table 7. In panel A, to which we will give most attention, the dependent
7This intuition is supported by supplementary regressions in which income and wealth were excluded
as regressors, giving a signi¯cantly positive coe±cient of LOEDUC.
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variable is DEMAND. Supplementary results, to investigate the sensitivity of the ¯ndings,
when applying the GP density weighted measure of demand, DEMAND1, are given in
panel B. In panel A, the GP density is included as a explanatory variable instead.
Explanatory variables included in both versions of the equation are the specialization
dummies, SPECGEN and SPECOTH, which may be interpreted by the market as observable
quality indicators. We also include the specialization dummy SPECCOM. We expect this
variable to have a negative e®ect on demand. One reason for this may be that GPs
who are specialists in community medicine are known to participate more frequently in
the community health service than GPs who do not have this specialization (Godager
and Lurº as, 2007), and as a result, they may supply fewer business hours per week and
hence appear less attractive for patients. To take account of observable GP heterogeneity
we in addition include dummy variables MARRIEDGP, IMMIGRGP and FEMALEGP, as well
as AGEGP as explanatory variables. Because the demand variable is time invariant, cf.
the ¯rst equation of (8), weighted between-GP estimation is used, the weighting being
motivated from the di®ering number of observations behind the GP-speci¯c means.
The GP density has a statistically signi¯cant e®ect on demand, and its coe±cient
has the expected negative sign (Table 7, Panel A). Second, the estimated coe±cient of
ALPHAHAT is negative and statistically signi¯cant { supporting the intuition that increased
63quality induces increased demand facing the GP. Furthermore, the estimated e®ect of
MARRIEDGP and SPECGEN indicate that being married and being a specialist in general
medicine contribute, ceteris paribus, to a higher market demand. While FEMALEGP is
not statistically signi¯cant, AGEGP comes out with a positive and statistically signi¯cant
e®ect. The latter results may be explained by the fact that a GP's age is correlated
with the number of years in GP practice, and that a GP who has been practicing for a
long time may be included in the choice set of a larger proportion of the consumers in
the market. This mechanism, however, is not explicitly accounted for in our theoretical
model. It would have been possible to capture it by introducing heterogeneous groups
of consumers with di®erent choice sets within the same market, and this can be done
simply by furnishing the parameter N with a group subscript.
As to the signs of the e®ects as well as their signi¯cance, the results in Panel B are
very similar to those in Panel A. Being married and being a specialist in general medicine
are both estimated to have a positive e®ect according to this model as well, and again,
AGEGP comes out with a signi¯cantly positive coe±cient.
Results for Model B
A stylized path diagram corresponding to Model B, with some details (inter alia, the
noise elements) omitted to preserve clarity, is given in Figure 2. The ovals and boxes
indicate latent and observable variables, respectively. This diagram may be a useful
reference for interpreting the results. The fact that no arrows point towards Quality and
Health symbolizes their exogeneity. The variables having arrows directed towards them
{ including all observed variables except x4 (not indicated in the ¯gure, cf. Equations (9)
and (16)) { are formally endogenous and correlated with at least one noise element. The
measurement model speci¯es how Quality, Health and Demand (all latent) are indicated
by observed variables; cf. Equations (11) and (10). As explained in Section 3, the model
consists of measurement equations and structural equations, the latter representing the
relationship between the three latent variables. In the sequel, we will let latent variables
be indicated by names having capitalized ¯rst letter and let observable variables have
non-capitalized ¯rst letter { following the conventional LISREL notation.
By modeling the demand facing the individual GP as a latent variable we are able
to utilize information on the rate at which patients leave the GP's list in order to join a
competitor's list. This approach thus takes into account how the demand facing the GPs
has developed after the introduction of the General Practitioner Scheme. In our case the
measurement model consists of two parts. The measurement equations for the exogenous
latent variables, in the LISREL notation in Section 3 referred to as »-variables, are
henceforth referred to as the X-measurement model. The measurement equations for the
dependent latent variable, in LISREL notation referred to as an ´-variable, is henceforth
referred to as the Y -measurement model. When interpreting the approach and the results
below, it should be recalled that the panel structure of the data { including the repeated
64observations of patients leaving the GP's list as well as of the excess mortality rates at
the level of the GP { is essential for obtaining the inference we want to make, as the
three latent variables in focus on Model B, Quality, Health and Demand, are all time
invariant.8 In total, Model B comprises 25 equations that are simultaneously estimated
by the Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. We start by presenting the results from
estimation of the structural equation before presenting the results from the estimation
of the equations in the two measurement models.
Figure 2: Model B: Stylized LISREL path diagram
The structural model (demand equation)
The results from estimation of the structural equation, corresponding to Equation (9),
are given in Table 8.
Our ¯rst major ¯nding is that the estimated e®ect of Quality on Demand is statisti-
cally signi¯cant and has the expected sign. Since the measurement scale of Demand is
the number of ¯rst rankings measured in hundreds, the interpretation of the coe±cient
estimate of 1.36 obtained is that a marginal increase in Quality, equivalent to a marginal
reduction in the excess mortality rates, increases Demand by 136 persons. Second, we
8As explained in Section 4, the observations from period 2 and 3 are linearly dependent by construction.
Therefore observations from period 2 are excluded from the data set when estimating Model B.
65¯nd that the estimated coe±cient of Health also is statistically signi¯cant with a positive
sign, which implies that the more healthy a GP's patients are, for a given level of quality,
the higher demand will be experienced. Also, the estimated coe±cient of femalegp is
negative and statistically signi¯cant.
As remarked in Section 2, heterogeneity of patients' ability to collect and process
available quality information may induce selection mechanisms resulting in systematic
di®erences in morbidity and mortality between GPs with di®erent levels of quality. We
have no prior knowledge of the direction in which this selection mechanism may go.
However, failing to control for di®ering aggregate health status of listed patients is likely
to result in a simultaneity bias and/or an excluded variable bias when estimating the e®ect
of quality on demand. Our approach separates the e®ect of quality on excess mortalities
from the e®ect of health at the level of the GP through the exclusion restrictions imposed
on the measurement equations for Quality and Health: six variables describing the GP are
included in the measurement equations for Quality, but excluded from the measurement
equations for Health, while three variables are included in the measurement equations for
Health but excluded from the measurement equations for Quality.
The estimated covariance matrix of the latent variables is given in Table 8, panel
B. Our results indicate that there is a negative association between Quality and Health.
What we observe is thus consistent with a situation where a selection mechanism exists
such that GPs with low quality of services are endowed with a patient stock with a better
health, as compared to GPs with higher quality of services. One may argue that Model B
does not reveal the e®ect of the GPs' quality on the initial health state of listed patients,
as it is set up to measure the e®ect of quality when controlling for initial health status of
patients showing between GP variation. To address the latter issue, and for the purpose
of conducting a robustness check of our main ¯ndings, we have additionally estimated
an alternative LISREL model where all latent variables enter as ´ variables, i.e., as
formally endogenous { Quality and Health being exogenous latent variables in Model B.
Such a model setup allows the estimation of the marginal e®ect of GP's quality on the
initial state of health. The results from this model, denoted as Model C, are reported in
Appendix D. The results con¯rm the results from Model B, that latent quality a®ects
latent demand positively. The numerical size of the e®ect is somewhat smaller, however.
The most important single result from estimation of Model C is that quality is found not
to have signi¯cant e®ect on the aggregate health status of the GP's listed patients.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Our analysis supports the hypothesis that the demand responds to the individual quality
of the GP. Even though our two di®erent approaches to quantifying this e®ect rely on
di®erent assumptions and di®erent methods, it may be argued that our two sets of results
pointing in the same direction, contribute to strengthening this conclusion. Our results
indicate that a marginal quality increase equivalent to a reduction of the mortality rate
66of one per thousand { being the implicit measurement scale of our quality indicator {
increases the demand facing the GP by 57 persons according to Model A and by 136
persons according to Model B. In interpreting this ¯nding one should recall that the
empirical results for Model A (presented in Section 5), rely on Version 2 from Section 3,
which imposes an asymmetry in the way quality a®ects latent GP-speci¯c heterogeneity
in the two equations. The estimators used under Model A, although enjoying consistency
under Version 2, are inconsistent if the less restrictive Version 1 is valid.
The latter has been our primary motivation for also modeling latent heterogeneity
within a LISREL framework. Our LISREL model, Model B, may be considered less
restrictive than Model A and also enables us to address more appropriately the issue that
the aggregate health status of listed patients, also considered an unobservable variable,
is likely to be related to the mortality rates at the level of the GP.
We believe that this econometric modeling tool has a wider application in assessing
the impact of quality of health care providers on demand for health services than the one
presented here. Our LISREL model separates the e®ect of quality on outcome measures
from the e®ect of patient health at the provider level through the exclusion restrictions
imposed on the measurement equations for the latent variables Quality and Health. An
idea for future research is to apply this modelling and estimation strategy to matched
hospital-patient data, in order to measure the impact of hospital quality on demand.
An important question from the point of view of policy implications is: how strong is
the e®ect of quality on demand? In the context of regression models answers to such
questions are often provided by means of appropriate elasticities. Due to the fact that the
mean value of latent variables are unde¯ned, the elasticities of interest, such as Quality
elasticity of demand are also unde¯ned. However, to get a `metric' for assessing the
magnitude of the e®ect we may compare the e®ect of quality on demand with the e®ect
of the observable GP speci¯c variables like the GP gender dummy and the dummy for
whether or not the GP is born in a non-scandinavian country. In case of model B, this
can be achieved by utilizing the standardized solution of our LISREL estimation in which
all e®ects are scaled in terms of their standard deviation. The standardized solution thus
obtained indicates that the e®ect of quality on demand is more than four times the e®ect
of the GP gender dummy and ten times the e®ect of non-Scandinavian GP dummy. It is
also illuminating to interpret the latter e®ect in relation to the standard deviation of the
Quality variable ¾Q (confer Table 8), panel B. We then ¯nd that an increase in quality
equivalent to a reduction of the patient mortality rate by one per thousand corresponds
to a change in Quality equal to 0:6397¾Q. An increase of this order of magnitude results
in an increase in Demand corresponding to 16% relative to the global mean of DEMAND,
given in table Table 3.
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68Table 1: Pattern of observations
Response pattern No. of GPs Freq., % Cum.freq., %
1111111 441 91.12 91.12
11111.. 11 2.27 93.39
111111. 11 2.27 95.66
1111... 8 1.65 97.31
111.... 7 1.45 98.76
11..... 5 1.03 99.79
11...11 1 0.21 100.00
¢¢ 484 100.00 ¢¢
Table 2: Variable definitions
Variable De¯nition, Type of variable Formula
DEAD No. of dead persons on GP's list
EXPDEAD No. of persons on GP's list Expected mortality rates based on
expected to die per year age distribution of persons on list and
population age-speci¯c mortality rates
ACTMORT Actual no. of mortalities per 1000 persons listed =DEAD/LISTSIZE
EXPMORT Expected no. of mortalities per 1000 persons listed =EXPDEAD/LISTSIZE
EXCMORT Excess mortality relative to list size =ACTMORT¡EXPMORT
LISTSIZE GP's actual no. of patients
DEMAND No. of persons ranking this GP as most
preferred when returning entry form
DEMAND1 Demand for this GP normalized against
GP density in municipality =DEMAND*GPDENSITY
AGEGP Age of GP, January 2002
LEAKRATE Share of patients switching to another GP. =no. of persons leaving/LISTSIZE
LOLEAK log(LEAKRATE/(1-LEAKRATE))
FEMALEGP Dummy, =1 if GP is female
MARRIEDGP Dummy, =1 if GP is married
IMMIGRGP Dummy, =1 if GP is non-Scandinavian citizen
SALARY Dummy, =1 if GP is remunerated by a ¯xed salary scheme
SPECGEN Dummy, =1 if GP is a specialist in general practice
SPECCOM Dummy, =1 if GP is a specialist in community medicine
SPECOTH Dummy, =1 if GP is a specialist in other kind of medicine
LEASTCENT Dummy, =1 if practice in Least central municipality
LESSCENT Dummy, =1 if practice in Less central municipality
CENTRAL Dummy, =1 if practice in Central municipality
MOSTCENT Dummy, =1 if practice in Most central municipality
PINCOME Median income (NOK1000) of
persons assigned to this GP in 2001
PWEALTH Median wealth (NOK1000) of
persons assigned to this GP in 2001
PFORMSUB Share of persons returning forms in 2001
among those assigned to this GP in 2001
LOSUBMIT log(PFORMSUB/(1-PFORMSUB))
PEDUC Share of persons without ¯nished high-school
among those assigned to this GP in 2001
LOEDUC log(PEDUC/(1-PEDUC))
GPDENSITY No. of GPs per 1000 inhabitans in municipality
69Table 3: Global descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean St.Dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
DEAD 3260 5.6254 4.2566 1.2850 5.3638 0 29
EXPDEAD 3275 5.1252 3.2353 1.1384 4.6549 0.0503 23.9037
ACTMORT 3251 4.7629 3.5683 1.9031 11.9554 0 37.9669
EXPMORT 3256 4.2390 2.1982 0.8033 3.3628 0.3781 13.6722
EXCMORT 3251 0.5235 2.6810 2.2873 17.5835 -8.4804 29.4960
DEMAND 3275 825.9289 520.5296 1.1275 4.8392 21 3152
DEMAND1 3275 716.0950 447.6848 1.1181 4.8671 18.3694 2757.1620
LEAKRATE 3251 0.0290 0.0269 6.2202 108.6469 0 0.6660
AGEGP 3275 47.0293 7.5861 0.0610 2.8225 28 70
FEMALEGP 3275 0.3600 0.4801 0.5833 1.3403 0 1
MARRIEDGP 3275 0.6889 0.4630 -0.8159 1.6656 0 1
IMMIGRGP 3275 0.0504 0.2188 4.1111 17.9015 0 1
SALARY 3275 0.0544 0.2267 3.9315 16.4564 0 1
LISTSIZE 3256 1211.0820 401.3513 0.1665 3.4662 123 2687
SPECGEN 3275 0.5597 0.4965 -0.2405 1.0578 0 1
SPECCOM 3275 0.0696 0.2545 3.3821 12.4389 0 1
SPECOTH 3275 0.0345 0.1825 5.1008 27.0180 0 1
LEASTCENT 3275 0.0256 0.1581 6.0012 37.0144 0 1
LESSCENT 3275 0.0116 0.1071 9.1212 84.1960 0 1
CENTRAL 3275 0.0403 0.1967 4.6747 22.8526 0 1
MOSTCENT 3275 0.9224 0.2675 -3.1588 10.9778 0 1
PINCOME 3275 196.5151 23.7784 0.2245 2.7626 130.9460 261.7615
PWEALTH 3275 63.4333 79.2646 1.2259 4.9701 -94.0780 467.3245
PFORMSUB 3275 0.7320 0.2642 -0.7781 2.5387 0.0554 1.0000
PEDUC 3275 0.4446 0.1524 -0.2344 2.4003 0.0213 0.8090
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the 484 GP-specific means
Variable Mean St.Dev Skew Kurt Min Max Between variation as
share of total, %
DEAD 5.5612 3.6936 1.1570 4.8702 0.0000 22.0816 75.3
EXPDEAD 5.0638 3.2286 1.2459 5.2236 0.3427 22.6007 99.6
ACTMORT 4.7216 2.9549 1.7391 11.2484 0.0000 28.1421 68.6
EXPMORT 4.2065 2.1513 0.8130 3.3556 0.4489 12.4530 95.8
EXCMORT 0.5151 1.8582 3.3390 30.4057 -4.1782 20.3758 48.0
LEAKRATE 0.0308 0.0255 4.4032 36.3194 0.0007 0.2737 90.2
LISTSIZE 1201.6160 401.2103 0.1835 3.4536 152.7857 2620.0000 99.9
70Table 5: Descriptive statistics for variables at the municipal level















Table 6: Model A. Mortality equation, GLS estimates


























¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level
¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level
71Table 7: Model A: Demand equation: Between GP estimates
No. of obs.=3251. No. of GPs=484. Obs. per GP.: min=1, mean=6.7, max=7
Descriptive statistics for Alphahat:
Mean:0.0000, St.Dev:1.1546, Skew:3.5900, Kurt:37.5611, Min:-3.3982, Max:13.1143
Demand measure 1: No. of first rankings, unweighted.
Demand measure 2: No. of GP density weighted first rankings
Demand measure 1 Demand measure 2
Regressor Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
GPDENS1 -950.3971 445.4716* .. ..
MARRIEDGP 144.8451 48.7506** 124.3429 42.1185**
SPECGEN 158.4471 54.4290** 140.2252 46.9876**
SPECCOM -156.025 90.4873 -136.4362 78.0651
SPECOTH -159.9245 125.6506 -134.8392 108.5775
ALPHAHAT -66.018 19.1214** -56.6003 16.5214**
IMMIGRGP -114.8588 104.0845 -95.0004 89.9192
FEMALEGP -89.3546 48.5764 -75.4430 41.9200
AGEGP 82.8435 29.0487** 72.4525 24.9295**
AGEGPSQ -0.8065 0.3023** -0.7066 0.2595**





F(10;473) = 7:72 F(9;474) = 7:86
p 0.0000 0.0000
¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level. ¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level







¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level
B. Variance and correlation matrix of latent variables




Health 0.0123 -0.4064 460.2335
72Appendix A: Model with excess mortality exogenous to demand
The estimation results when excess mortality rates at the level of the GP is entered as an exoge-
nous explanatory variable are presented in Table A.1, panel A based on the dependent variable
DEMAND, panel B on the dependent variable DEMAND1. The only di®erence between the results
presented in Table A.1 and the results presented in Table 7 is that ALPHAHAT is replaced by
EXCMORT. The latter variable is now assumed to be a valid proxy for quality, and is assumed to
be uncorrelated with the error components. We see that the estimated e®ect of GP density is sta-
tistically signi¯cant and has the expected sign. We see that being married and being a specialist
in general medicine have a positive and statistically signi¯cant e®ect on demand. We also see that
AGEGP has a statistically signi¯cant e®ect. The e®ect of EXCMORT is negative and statistically
signi¯cant. An interpretation may be that a marginal increase in quality, measured in terms of
a reduction in the excess mortality rates, increase the demand facing the GP. The magnitude of
the estimated coe±cient indicates that a marginal quality increase equivalent to a reduction of
the mortality rate of one per thousand, increases the demand facing the GP by 90 persons (Panel
A). We note that the estimated coe±cients on EXCMORT are larger in absolute value than the
coe±cients on ALPHAHAT in Table 7. An interpretation of this result, while recalling that the
dimension of the coe±cients are the same, is that by representing quality by EXCMORT, as in
Table A.1, we disregard the variation in health status between GPs. We cannot assess whether
high excess mortality is a result of low quality or bad health status of the listed patients.
Table A.1: Model A: Between GP estimates of demand equation.
No. of obs.=3251. No. of GPs=484. Obs. per GP.: min=1, mean=6.7, max=7
Demand measure 1: No. of first rankings, unweighted.
Demand measure 2: No. of GP density weighted first rankings
Demand measure 1 Demand measure 2
Regressor Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
GPDENS1 -922.5879 424.9770* .. ..
MARRIEDGP 113.9111 46.7327* 97.3718 40.3584*
SPECGEN 150.8321 51.9366** 133.7817 44.8165**
SPECCOM -156.9416 86.3357 -137.5563 74.4515
SPECOTH -182.0114 119.8388 -153.7605 103.5101
EXCMORT -90.6113 11.7378** -78.5167 10.1394**
IMMIGRGP -119.6318 99.2157 -99.4600 85.6771
FEMALEGP -133.5571 46.6809** -113.5944 40.2677**
AGEGP 72.0700 27.7608** 62.9205 23.8148**
AGEGPSQ -0.7207 0.2887* -0.6302 0.2478*





F(10;473) = 13:12 F(9;474) = 13:87
p 0.0000 0.0000
¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level. ¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level.
Appendix B: Details on the measurement equations of Model B
The X-measurement model: The left hand side of Figure 2 describes the relations in the
X-measurement model. Since latent variables by de¯nition do not have a scale of measurement,
the scale of the latent variables are de¯ned by ¯xing one or more of the factor loadings. In order
to make the results from LISREL estimation comparable to the results from Model A we have
scaled the » variable Quality to be measured in (negative) units of per thousand excess mortality
rates. By ¯xing the factor loading of pincome on Health, we have scaled the » variable Health to
be measured in units of thousand Norwegian kroner. The interpretation is that the GP's gender
73and country of birth is expected to a®ect the demand directly, without being indicators of either
quality or health status of listed patients.
The excess mortality rate from each period is entered as an indicator of GP quality and as
indicators of the aggregate measure of health status of listed persons. Other variables included
as indicators of quality are dummy variables indicating GP specialization, a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the GP is remunerated by means of a ¯xed salary, a dummy variable
indicating whether or not the GP is married and the GP's age. The proportion of listed individuals
without ¯nished high school and the proportion of listed individuals who submitted the entry
form in 2001 are included as indicators of the aggregate health measure. The estimation results,
corresponding to Equation (11), are given in Table B.1.
The estimated factor loading of Quality on married, agegp and specgen1 are statistically
signi¯cant, and the interpretation is that married GPs, GPs who are specialists in general medicine
is associated with higher quality and that there is a positive relation between GP age and provided
quality. All the factor loadings of Health are statistically signi¯cant, and we see that excess
mortality rates are negatively related to Health. We see that Health is positively related to the
share of individuals who submitted the entry form in 2001, and that our latent aggregate health
measure is negatively related to the proportion of listed persons with short schooling, as expected.
The estimated covariance matrix of error terms in Equation (11) is given in Table B.2. We
have added some restrictions on the correlation of error terms from di®erent x-regressions. With
some exceptions error terms from di®erent regressions are uncorrelated. Error terms in regres-
sions on the quality indicators related to GP specialization, specgen1, specoth1 and speccom1,
are allowed to be correlated. Further, error terms relating to the excess mortality rates regression
from period t are allowed to be correlated with error terms in period t¡1.
The Y -measurement model: The right hand side of Figure 2 describes the relations in the
Y -measurement model. Here the observable variable demand1 enters the model as an indicator
of the ´ variable Demand. The variable demand1 is identical to the GP density weighted number
of ¯rst rankings applied in estimation of Model A.
The factor loading of Demand on demand1 is ¯xed to 100 and the ´ variable Demand is thus
measured in units of hundred ¯rst rankings. The log-odds-ratio of the proportion of listed persons
leaving the list in period t, loleakt, are entered as indicators of Demand. The estimation results,
corresponding to Equation (10), are given in Table B.3. All the factor loadings are statistically
signi¯cant, and the factor loadings of the loleakt variables and the factor loading of Demand on
demand1 are of opposite sign, as one should expect. The estimated covariance matrix of error
terms in Equation (10) is given in Table B.4. No restrictions are imposed on this matrix.
Table B.1: Model B: X-measurement equations
No. of obs.=484.
Regressors » variable: Quality » variable: Health
Dep. var. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
excmort1 -1 (Fixed) -0.0614 0.0127**
excmort3 -1 (Fixed) -0.0498 0.0121**
excmort4 -1 (Fixed) -0.0581 0.0123**
excmort5 -1 (Fixed) -0.0458 0.0120**
excmort6 -1 (Fixed) -0.0673 0.0127**
excmort7 -1 (Fixed) -0.0445 0.0119**
loeduc 0 (Fixed) -0.0283 0.0025**
losubmit 0 (Fixed) 0.0374 0.0158*
pincome 0 (Fixed) 1 (Fixed)
femalegp 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
immigrgp 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
married 0.0558 0.0161** 0 (Fixed)
agegp 1.0471 0.2692** 0 (Fixed)
salary1 0.0033 0.0079 0 (Fixed)
specgen1 0.0658 0.0174** 0 (Fixed)
specoth1 -0.0056 0.0064 0 (Fixed)
speccom1 0.0056 0.0086 0 (Fixed)
¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level. ¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level.
74Table B.2: Model B: Error covariance matrix of X-measurement equations
excmort1 excmort3 excmort4 excmort5 excmort6 excmort7
excmort1 0.7120
excmort3 0.1371 0.6403
excmort4 { 0.0727 0.6520
excmort5 { { -0.0077 0.6397
excmort6 { { { -0.1060 0.6625
excmort7 { { { { 0.0046 0.6026
loeduc pincome losubmit salary1 married agegp specgen1 specoth1 speccom1
loeduc 0.2931
pincome { 0.1951
losubmit { { 0.9866
salary1 { { { 0.9995
married { { { { 0.9648
agegp { { { { { 0.9550
specgen1 { { { { { { 0.9575
specoth1 { { { { { { -0.0043 0.9979
speccom1 { { { { { { 0.1463 -0.0082 0.9988
Table B.3: Model B: Y -measurement equations
No. of obs.=484.
´ variable: Demand








¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level.
¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level.
Table B.4: Model B: Error covariance matrix of Y -measurement equations
loleak1 loleak3 loleak4 loleak5 loleak6 loleak7 demand1
loleak1 0.4024
loleak3 0.2469 0.4318
loleak4 0.1819 0.2454 0.9014
loleak5 0.2058 0.2489 0.5517 0.8818
loleak6 0.1312 0.1983 0.3027 0.4874 0.9123
loleak7 0.2182 0.2768 0.1667 0.2079 0.1671 0.9673
demand1 -0.0235 0.0049 -0.0101 -0.0394 0.0359 -0.0858 0.2182
Appendix C: Alternative LISREL model. Model C
75Table C.1: Model C: Equations for latent dependent variables.
A. Coefficient estimates
Regressors
Quality immigrant married agegp femalegp
Dep. var. Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err. Est. Std.Err.
Demand 0.9759 0.1487** -1.2020 0.7935 1.2539 0.3748** 0.0293 0.0226 -0.6711 0.3733
Health -0.0019 0.0019 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level. ¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level.
B. Variance and correlation matrix of latent variables




Health -0.1268 -0.0434 0.0005




DEP VAR Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err. Estimate Std.Err.
demand1 0 (Fixed) 100.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
loleak1 0 (Fixed) -0.1576 (0.0178)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak3 0 (Fixed) -0.1650 (0.0186)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak4 0 (Fixed) -0.3930 (0.0598)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak5 0 (Fixed) -0.2673 (0.0392)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak6 0 (Fixed) -0.4151 (0.0663)** 0 (Fixed)
loleak7 0 (Fixed) -0.2038 (0.0339)** 0 (Fixed)
speccom1 0.0016 (0.0092) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
specoth1 -0.0046 (0.0069) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
specgen1 0.0452 (0.0181)** 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
salary1 0.0055 (0.0085) 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed)
excmort1 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -39.3361 (9.9107)**
excmort3 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -28.0050 (9.1767)**
excmort4 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -35.8985 (9.4614)**
excmort5 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -24.0063 (9.1388)**
excmort6 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -44.6527 (9.8519)**
excmort7 -1.0000 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -23.3650 (9.0128)**
pincome 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 1000.0000 (Fixed)
pwealth 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 439.5965 (174.5656)**
loeduc 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) -26.9137 (2.5591)**
losubmit 0 (Fixed) 0 (Fixed) 37.1699 (15.3537)**
¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 5 % level. ¤¤) Signi¯cantly 6= 0 at the 1 % level.
76Table C.3: Model C: Error covariance matrix in Y -measurement equations
demand1 loleak1 loleak3 loleak4 loleak5 loleak6 loleak7
demand1 21999.3356
loleak1 9.7168 0.2958
loleak3 51.4310 0.1182 0.1773
loleak4 283.0998 { 0.0333 5.9740
loleak5 174.9324 { { 1.5528 2.0378
loleak6 339.9960 { { { 1.4497 8.5124
loleak7 153.7280 { { { { -0.1123 2.7219
excmort1 excmort3 excmort4 excmort5 excmort6 excmort7
excmort1 6.2133
excmort3 1.0092 3.9033
excmort4 { 0.3908 4.4066
excmort5 { { -0.1208 3.8241
excmort6 { { { -0.8207 5.1367
excmort7 { { { { -0.0872 3.2198
speccom1 specoth1 specgen1 salary1 pincome pwealth loeduc losubmit
speccom1 0.0635
specoth1 -0.0005 0.0358
specgen1 0.0191 -0.0009 0.2444
salary1 { { { 0.0544
pincome { { { 87.6548
pwealth { { { { { 6131.2983
loeduc { { { { { { 0.1696
losubmit { { { { { { { 47.5383
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Summary 
In 2001, a listpatient system with capitation payment was introduced in Norwegian general practice. After 
an allocation process where each inhabitant was listed with a general practitioner (GP), a considerable 
share of the GPs got fewer persons listed than they would have preferred. We examine whether GPs who 
experience a shortage of patients to a larger extent than other GPs seek to hold a second job in the 
community health service even though the wage rate is low compared to the wage rate in general practice. 
Assuming utility maximization, we model the effect of patient shortage on a GP’s decision to contract for a 
second job in the community health service. The model predicts a positive relationship between patient 
shortage and participation in the community health service. This prediction is tested by means of censored 
regression analyses, taking account of labour supply as a censored variable. We find a significant effect of 
patient shortage on the number of hours the GPs supply to community health service. The estimated 
marginal effect is 1.72 hours per week. 
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1. Introduction and background 
Physicians holding dual or multiple jobs can be observed in both developing and high-
income countries. In various institutional settings, incentives for dual job holding may 
emerge as a result of complementarities between jobs. Opportunities for cream skimming 
or self-referrals of patients from the public sector to own private practice seem to 
encourage dual practice (Gonzalez, 2004, Barros and Olivella, 2005, Iversen, 1997, 
Eggleston and Bir, 2006 ). While dual practice is strictly regulated or prohibited in some 
countries such as Canada, it is often a result of tight public health care budgets in low 
income countries (Bir and Eggleston, 2003, Jan et al. 2005).  
 
A decision to hold a second job may also be driven by constraints in the physician’s 
primary job. Shishko and Rostker (1976) showed that restrictions on hours worked in the 
primary job imply incentives to hold a second job (moonlighting), and that individuals 
experiencing such restrictions may accept wage rates that are lower than the wage rate in 
the primary job. In a study of moonlighting decisions by resident physicians, Culler and 
Bazzoli (1985) found that the number of hours employed in resident programs had a 
negative effect on the supply of moonlighting labour. In this paper we explore this further 
by questioning whether general practitioners (GPs) experiencing patient shortage in their 
private practice to a larger extent than unconstrained GPs seek to hold a second job in 
community health service, even though the hourly wage rate in this job is considerably 
lower than the hourly income from working in general practice. By means of an empirical 
analysis based on data from 387 GPs practicing in 26 municipalities in Norway and two 
districts in Oslo (the capital city), we find that GPs experiencing patient shortage supply 
more hours to the community health service compared to GPs who are not experiencing a 
shortage of patients in their private practice. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the organization of primary 
health care in Norway and in section 3 we model the effect of patient shortage on a GP’s 
decision to contract for a second job in the community health service. Section 4 describes 
the data, while empirical specification and estimation methods are presented in section 5.   80 
The results are given in Section 6, while section 7 concludes and discusses policy 
implications of the findings. 
2. The organization of primary health care in Norway 
Norway has a national health service which is mainly tax-financed. The organization of 
primary health care is the responsibility of the municipalities, which is the lowest 
governmental level. Due to the implementation of a listpatient system (the regular general 
practitioner scheme) in 2001, every inhabitant is registered with a GP. More than 90 % of 
the GPs are self-employed with a payment system consisting of  30 % per capita payment 
from the municipalities and 70 % fee for service payment from the National Insurance 
Administration and from patients’ co-payments. The fee for service component is paid 
according to a fixed fee schedule negotiated between the state and the Norwegian 
Medical Association.
 The fees depend on the duration of the consultation, whether certain 
types of examinations and laboratory tests are initiated during the consultation, and 
whether the GP is a specialist in general medicine. The patients pay a fixed fee per 
consultation (amounting to € 14.70 in 2002) with an annual ceiling.  
 
Privately practicing GPs are responsible for providing general medical services to 
persons listed in their practices. However, certain segments of the primary care sector are 
not part of the domain of general practice: 
 
  Administration of the primary health care sector 
  Public health services such as the preparation of infectious disease plans  
  Certain medical tasks such as routine examinations of infants and children at 
childcare centers and schools, and regular medical care at nursing homes, prisons 
and other institutions  
These tasks are part of the community health service, and carried out by GPs working in 
part-time positions in the municipality. Positions in community health service are 
remunerated according to a fixed salary scheme negotiated in centralized wage 
settlements between the Norwegian Medical Association and the Norwegian Association 
of Local and Regional Authorities. These positions have long been regarded as 
unprofitable among the GPs. The hourly wage rate for GPs working in community health   81 
service is estimated to be between 38% and 66% of the wage rate in private practice 
(Godager and Lurås, 2005). According to prevailing regulations, the municipalities can 
require GPs to work up to 7.5 hours per week with community health service tasks. This 
requirement has important implications for our empirical analysis, and will be discussed 
in more detail in Sections 3 to 5. 
 
3. A model for the effect of patient shortage on a GP’s decision 
to contract for a second job in community health service 
We model the effect of patient shortage on a representative GP’s decision to contract for 
a second job in community health service. We assume that all persons listed with the GP 
are homogeneous with respect to their need for health care, and that the GP provides a 
fixed amount of a composite health service to every person on the list. The GP faces a 
market demand, 
D n , of persons who request to be listed in the practice. We further 
assume that the GP is not able to affect 
D n , and that the market demand constitutes an 
exogenous upper limit to the number of persons listed.
1 A GP experiences patient 
shortage when the market demand, 
D n , is less than the GP’s preferred list size,
P n .  
 
In the model we take account of the municipalities’ option to require GPs to work up to 
7.5 hours per week in community health service by including the restriction that the GP 
cannot work less than hours per week with these tasks, where ranges from zero to 
7.5 hours. The upper limit of 7.5 hours is part of central regulations. However, the local 
health authorities may set  lower than 7.5 hours.   
 
The physician maximizes a quasi linear objective function  () U c v l  , where c is 
consumption and l is leisure. We assume  '( ) 0,    ''( ) 0 v l v l  and 




We disregard savings, and the amount of consumption equals the GP’s monetary income. 
The GP’s total income from working in private practice (the primary job) and in 
community health service (the second job) is qn w  , where n is the number of persons 
listed and q is the income per listed person
2; w is the fixed hourly wage rate the GP   82 
receives if contracting for a second job in the community health service; and  is the 
number of hours worked in this job. Leisure is defined by l T nt     , where T is the 
total time endowment and t is the strictly positive time input per person listed in the GP’s 
practice.  
 
One may think of the model as dynamic with sequential decision making, where the GP 
first decides on the desired number of patients, 
P n , conditional on minimum hours in the 
community health service,    . In the next step, demand, 
D n , is revealed and 
determines whether patient shortage occur. In the last step, the GP decides his or her 
optimal number of hours in the community health service. A static formulation of the 
model may be specified without loss of generality, and we formulate the maximization 
problem as one where the GP choose optimal n and   given that the number of persons 
requesting to be listed in the GP’s practice (
D n ) and the number of hours the GP is 
required to work in the community health service () restrict the opportunity set. The 
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The problem is solved by means of concave programming (details can be found in the 
appendix). Assuming that the wage rate in the community health service is lower than the 




 , we can make the following predictions: 
 
  Unconstrained GPs have a higher marginal utility of leisure than constrained GPs. 
Hence, the GPs without patient shortage do not contract for more than the required 
number of hours () with the community health service. The unconstrained GPs   83 
adjust the number of listed persons such that the marginal income equals the marginal 
utility of leisure. 
  Constrained GPs of type 1 are defined as those who have a lower marginal utility of 
leisure than GPs without patient shortage, and a higher marginal utility of leisure than 
the wage rate offered by the community health service. These GPs respond to patient 
shortage by consuming more leisure and will not contract for more than the minimum 
requirement (). 
  Constrained GPs of type 2 are defined as those who have a lower marginal utility of 
leisure than the wage rate offered by the community health service at  . These 
GPs will obtain a higher utility if they contract for more than  hours with the 
community health service. Their optimal number of hours contracted for are 
determined such that the marginal utility of leisure equals the wage rate in the 
community health service. The optimal number of hours contracted for is a strictly 
declining function of the market demand for being listed with the GP. 
 
The predictions are summarized in Table I. 
 
 
Based on the predictions from the theoretical model, the following hypotheses will be 
tested in the empirical section: 
1: Constrained GPs contract for more hours with the community health service than 
unconstrained GPs. 
2: Constrained GPs with short lists contract for more hours with the community health 
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Table I: Effects of patient shortage on the number of hours contracted with the 
community health service (*denotes solution values). 
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4. Description of the data 
Because the municipalities’ organization of primary health care differ according to the 
centrality of the municipality, we randomly selected the included municipalities 
according to a centrality measure developed by Statistics Norway
3 (Statistics Norway, 
1994). This sampling design was chosen in order to include a representative sample of 
Norwegian municipalities in the analysis. 
 
In every selected municipality we asked the health administration to fill in a postal 
questionnaire on the number of hours each GP had contracted for work in the community 
health service and on their wage rate when performing these tasks. This information was 
merged with registered information on the GPs and the GPs’ patient lists from The 
National Insurance Administration. The response rate on the survey was 100 %. The final 
sample includes 387 self-employed GPs from 26 municipalities and two districts in Oslo.  
 
The number of hours per week the GPs work in the community health service 
(WEEKHRS) ranges from zero to 22 (Figure I). Nearly 85 % of the GPs contract for 7.5 
hours or less and only 10 % do not have part-time positions in the community health 
service. In 14 of the municipalities every GP participate in community health service 
tasks. A majority of the GPs (90 %) receive an hourly wage rate (WAGERATE) in the   85 
range of € 23 to € 27. Because the wage rate is negotiated in central wage settlements and 
the range of the wage rates is quite small, we find it reasonable to assume it to be 
exogenous to the individual GP. For 80 of the GPs, information on the wage rate was 
missing, so the mean wage rate among the other GPs in the municipality was applied. 
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Prior to the 2001 reform, the GPs were asked to specify the number of persons they 
preferred to have on their lists. The GPs are allowed to adjust their preferred list size 
continuously, and this individual list size limit is public information. Preferred list size is 
updated in the database in January and July every year. To measure whether a GP 
experiences patient shortage or not, we compute an indicator (SHORTAGE) which 
equals 1 if the GP failed to achieve the preferred list size in both January and July 2002 
(Iversen and Lurås, 2002). The survey data describes the contracts prevailing in June 
2002. The indicator of patient shortage is therefore assumed to be predetermined and 
exogenous, in the empirical specification.  
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From the theoretical model, we predicted a relationship between list size and the number 
of hours the constrained GPs have contracted for work in the community health service. 
However, since the GPs not experiencing patient shortage can increase their list size, and 
it follows from the model that increasing the list size is preferable to contracting for work 
in the community health service, the number of hours supplied by unconstrained GPs is 
not expected to depend on list size. We include an interaction term (LISTSHORT) 
consisting of the GP’s list size multiplied by the shortage variable to account for this 
relationship. 
 
To account for observable heterogeneity, we introduce variables describing 
characteristics of the GP and the GP’s patient list. These variables can be interpreted as 
taste shifters in the utility function. We include four variables characterizing the GP:  the 
GP’s gender, the GP’s age, and whether the GP has achieved specialist status in general 
medicine or in community medicine. 
 
From the literature we know that female physicians carry out longer consultations than 
male GPs do (Iversen and Lurås, 2000, Kristiansen and Mooney, 1993, Langwell 1982). 
We also know that females, to a larger extent than males, prefer to work part-time 
(Paulsen and Fjermestad, 1996). Females and males may therefore have different views 
regarding tasks in community health service. We account for the GP’s gender by 
including a dummy variable FEMALE that equals 1 if the GP is female. To account for 
differences in medical experiences among GPs, we include the GP’s age (GPAGE). GPs 
may specialize in general medicine or in community medicine. Specialists in general 
medicine receive a higher fee per consultation from the National Insurance than GPs 
without this speciality. It is therefore plausible to assume that they have a higher 
reservation-wage and hence, it is less likely that specialists in general medicine contract 
for more than the required amount of hours. To indicate the GP’s specialisation we 
include two dummy variables: SPECGEN equals 1 if the GP is a specialist in general 
medicine and SPECCOM equals 1 if the GP is a specialist in community medicine. 
Specialists in community medicine are expected to contract for more hours with the 
community health service than the other GPs.   87 
 
The observed heterogeneity of the GP’s patient list is account for by including the 
proportion of females and the proportion of old persons on the list. From the literature we  
know that females and elderly patients on average visit their GPs more often than men 
and younger patients do (Elstad, 1991). The proportion of female persons on the list 
(PROPFEM), and the proportion of elderly (PROPOLD) take account of the patient load 
on a GP’s list. Because GPs with a heavier than average patient load may work longer 
hours, GPs with many females and many elderly on their lists are expected to contract for 
fewer hours in the community health service. Descriptive statistics of the whole sample, 
of GPs contracting for less or equal to 7.5 hours, and for GPs contracting for more than 
7.5 hours, are given in Table II. 
 
Table II: Descriptive statistics. 
* Community health service 
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5. Empirical specification and estimation 
From the theoretical model in Section 3 we predicted that, ceteris paribus, a GP who 
experiences patient shortage contracts for more hours in the community health service 
than GPs not experiencing patient shortage, and that constrained GPs contract for more 
hours the shorter their lists are. In Section 4 we formulated some hypotheses on the effect 
of exogenous variables on the number of hours GPs contract for with the community 
health service. These hypotheses will be tested by means of estimation on reduced form 
equations. 
 
In standard labour markets, individuals who choose not to offer their working capacity to 
the market will be observed with a labour supply of zero hours, i.e., the variable is 
censored in zero. Because the municipalities can require GPs to contract for up to 7.5 
hours per week we must allow the GP’s specific censoring threshold to vary in the 
interval   0,7.5  hours. When the dependent variable is censored, a linear regression 
analysis will not give consistent estimates (Tobin, 1958).  
 
Demographic and cultural characteristics and the way primary care is organised are likely 
to influence a GP’s practice style and hence our observations of GPs at the municipality 
level. An appropriate choice of empirical model and estimation method should therefore 
take account of unobserved municipality-specific heterogeneity. Since we have repeated 
observations from the same municipality, we are able to take account of such 
heterogeneity by applying fixed or random effects estimation. We estimate two censored 
regression models, one without heterogeneity and one with municipality fixed effects
4. 
The estimation is performed using the interval regression module in the computer 
software STATA 9.0. It should be noted that fixed effect tobit estimation does not yield 
consistent estimators when the number of municipalities goes to infinity and the number 
of GPs is finite. On the other hand, consistency is ensured with a finite number of 
municipalities when the number of GPs goes to infinity (Hsiao, 2003, p 243). Because the 
number of municipalities is much smaller than the number of GPs, we argue that the 
application of a fixed effects tobit model is well-founded.  
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Let  ij y   denote the latent number of hours GP i practicing in municipality j prefers to 
work in the community health service. We may interpret ij y   as the optimal labour supply 
resulting from utility maximization without restricting labour supply to be positive 
(Amemiya, 1984, Maddala, 1983). Further, let ij y  denote the number of hours contracted 
with GP i in municipality j. When   0,7.5 ij y  , we do not know whether the contract is a 
result of the GP’s own choice or if the GP is required to contract with the municipality. If 
a GP has contracted for 
0
ij y hours,   
0 0,7.5 ij y  , the only information we have is 
that
0
ij ij yy   . For  7.5 ij y  , however, the contract is assumed to be a result of the GP’s 
own decision, and observations of  7.5 ij y   therefore enter the regression equation as a 
continuous variable.  
 
We then have: 
0  if   > 7.5 and   if  7.5  ij ij ij ij ij ij y y y y y y       where 
0
ij y is the individual 
specific censoring threshold. Note that compared to an approach where every observation 
is assigned a censoring threshold equal to 7.5 hours, assigning an individual specific 
threshold implies a more efficient use of information on the latent labour supply. We 
therefore assign the individual specific thresholds according to the following rule:  
0
0
  if   7.5










We may now specify our censored regression model: 
0










where is a   vector of parameters and  is a  ij x vector of explanatory variables, including 
municipality dummies, assumed to be uncorrelated with the residuals,  ij  . The residuals 
are assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and a common variance
2  . 
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6. Results 
The results from the tobit regression analyses are reported in Table III. By means of a 
likelihood ratio test we find that the model without heterogeneity is rejected in favour of 
the fixed effects model. In the following we therefore discuss the results from the fixed 
effects model. The results indicate that the constrained GPs contract for more hours with 
the community health service, and that the longer the constrained GPs’ lists are, the fewer 
hours are contracted for. The results are consistent with the predictions from our 
theoretical model in Section 3. The effect of wage rate is statistically significant and the 
coefficient has the expected sign. At first glance the marginal effect may seem large: 
increasing the hourly wage rate by a marginal EURO increases the preferred number of 
working hours by one hour and ten minutes per week. However, this effect is the 
predicted increase in the latent labour supply, and not an effect on hours actually 
supplied. Owing to the large number of censored observations, the effect on the number 
of hours actually supplied will be considerably lower. In the right column of the table we 
therefore present the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the number of hours 
actually supplied, conditional on the number of hours being more than 7.5. We see that, 
conditional on working more than 7.5 hours (WEEKHRS>7.5), increasing the wage rate 
by one EURO increases the GPs’ observed labour supply by 0.154 hours per week. This 
result corresponds to a conditional supply elasticity with respect to wage rate of 0.32. 
When standard errors are calculated by means of the delta method
5, the 95 % confidence 
interval of the conditional supply elasticity is [0.018 - 0.629], which is comparable in 
magnitude to physician labour supply elasticities found in other studies (Rizzo and 
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Table III Results from censored regression analysis 
The estimated effect of explanatory variables on the number of hours supplied to the community health 
service (WEEKHRS). Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. N=387.  
Observations per municipality: min=1, mean=14.3, max=108  
 
 
*   The estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 5% level in a two-tailed test 
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(14.901) cc   
 
-36.807ccc 
        (16.685)*    
 
     
Log pseudo-likelihood  -334.296  -308.844 
P-value  0.000  0.000 
Likelihood ratio test of  model 
without heterogeneity 
LR chi2 (26) =     50.90 
P-value= 0.002 
     
Censoring summary          327  left-censored observations 
60   uncensored observations   92 
 
   
The marginal effect of patient shortage indicates that the effect of experiencing patient 
shortage on the conditional supply of hours is 1.72 hours per week. The marginal effect 
of the interaction term (LISTSHORT) indicates that increasing the constrained GP’s list 
size by 100 persons reduces the conditional supply of hours by 0.1 hours per week. We 
also observe a significant effect from being a specialist in community medicine 
(SPESCOM). As expected, specialists in community medicine supply more hours than 




The use of tobit models to estimate labour supply functions has been criticised, first, 
because of the assumption that the observed labour supply is truncated normal and 
second, for not separating the decision of whether to participate in the labour market from 
the decision of how many hours to supply (Cragg, 1971, Melenberg and Van Soest, 
1996). In situations where labour supply is clustered around 35 to 40 hours per week, 
two-part models with less restrictive assumptions where the model for working hours 
among individuals with positive supply is separated from the model of whether to 
participate are shown to be more appropriate (Moffit, 1999, Mroz, 1987). This type of 
clustering distant from the censoring threshold does not appear in our data. However, as a 
robustness check we estimated a two-step Heckman error correction model. In the first 
step we estimated the probability of working more than 7.5 hours per week by means of a 
probit model, and in the second step, including the inverse mills ratio as an explanatory 
variable, we estimated the supply of hours conditional on working more than 7.5 hours. 
In this analysis the effect of WAGERATE and SPECCOM was found to have a 
significant effect only on the probability of working more than 7.5 hours per week, 
whereas, SHORTAGE, and LISTSHORT had significant effects on both the probability 
of working more than 7.5 hours per week and on the supply of hours conditional of 
working more than 7.5 hours per week.  
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We also estimated the probability of working more than 7.5 hours by means of fixed 
effects logit estimation. One advantage with the logit model is that conditional fixed 
effect estimation yields estimators that are consistent when both the number of 
municipalities and the number of GPs goes to infinity. The logit estimates confirm the 
results from the fixed effect tobit estimation. 
 
To check whether our results are sensitive to the choice of shortage indicator, we have 
estimated several models with different definitions of patient shortage including an 
indicator equal to 1 if the GP’s list was shorter than preferred in January 2002 only, and 
in July 2002 only. The results from these analyses are similar to the results presented in 
Table III.  We also applied a shortage indicator equal to 1 if the discrepancy between 
preferred and actual list size in July 2002 was more than ten people. The effect of patient 
shortage is slightly strengthened
 in these analyses, and the p-value is somewhat lower.
6 
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7. Conclusion and policy implications 
Results from our empirical analysis indicate that GPs experiencing patient shortage in 
their private practices contract for more hours with the community health service, and 
that the shorter their patient lists are, the more working hours they supply. If we interpret 
contracting for more than the minimum number of hours required by the municipality as 
holding a second job, our results are in accordance with the literature on multiple job 
holding (Shishko and Rostker, 1976, Culler and Bazzoli, 1985). Earlier studies on 
Norwegian GPs have revealed that there is a positive relationship between patient 
shortage and service provision (Iversen and Lurås, 2000, Iversen, 2004). In the current 
paper we find that GPs experiencing patient shortage contract for more hours of 
community health service than unconstrained GPs. Hence, it seems that GPs compensate 
for a shortage of patients in several ways. 
 
The fact that we make no attempt to model the demand side for labour in community 
health service might be considered to be a limitation of this study, and including the 
demand side is an idea for further research. It is well known, however, that for many 
years Norwegian municipalities have had problems attracting qualified physicians to 
positions in community health service. The main reason is that these positions are 
regarded as less profitable among GPs, reflecting that the hourly wage rate is 
considerably lower than the income from one hour in private practice. Our results 
indicate both that the wage rates affect supply and that GPs will work in the community 
health service at the going wage rate if they are experiencing patient shortage in their 
private practice. One important policy implication of this finding is that for a given level 
of wage rates, recruiting GPs to positions in the community health service will be easier 
if a considerable share of the GPs experience patient shortage. 
 
One may argue that low wage rates in community health service may discourage equal 
distribution of health care services: People living in areas where a large share of the GPs 
experience patient shortage will have better access both to general practice and to   95 
services provided by the community health service compared to people living in areas 
where few GPs experience patient shortage.  
 
The analysis also shows that a listpatient system with capitation payment that was 
implemented to encourage continuity of care in general practice may have an unexpected 
influence on GPs’ involvement in community health service. Hence, it seems that the 
organization of general practice may cause spill-over effects in another part of the health 
care system. This result is in accordance with the literature on spill-over effects, showing 
that the incentive structure in one market may have implications for behaviour in other 
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1 This may be an unreasonable assumption in the long run. In the short run, however, it seems likely that 
GPs do not have discretionary power to change the demand. 
2 Because we assume constant service intensity, the income from private practice is proportional to the 
number of listed persons n. 
3 The centrality indicator captures the size of the population, population density, and the distance to the 
nearest city of a certain size.   96 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 We also estimated a random effects model. STATA uses adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature to compute 
the log-likelihood and the derivatives when estimating random effects tobit regressions. We do not present 
the results from this regression since the estimated coefficients were sensitive to the number of quadrature 
points applied, indicating that the quadrature approximation is not accurate. 
5 The elasticity and its standard error are provided by the software. 
6 We also tested other indicators of shortage. When the discrepancy between preferred and actual list size is 
increased to more than 35 people, the effect of patient shortage is not significantly different from zero. The 
reason is probably that the number of GPs classified as experiencing patient shortage is reduced when the 
patient shortage criterion is strengthened, which implies increasing standard errors in the estimated 
parameters. Most likely this happens because of the small sample size.   97 
Appendix: Derivation of the results in Section 2 
The results are derived under the assumption that the marginal income from general 





















Necessary and sufficient conditions for  0 n   and   to solve the problem are that 
there exists non-negative  og   such that: 
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We distinguish between constrained and unconstrained GPs.  
 
The unconstrained GP 
This GP does not experience patient constraints, implying . With , (4) can be 
written: 




       
The rhs of (6) expresses the income per time unit of adding a new person to the list. The 
unconstrained GP adjusts the number of patients such that the marginal income equals the   98 
marginal utility of leisure.  
 
We may now derive the unconstrained GP’s labour supply to community health service. 
We show that assuming a non-binding minimum requirement constraint contradicts (1). 
Inserting 0   and substituting 
q
t





 , which contradicts (1)  
We thus conclude: 
0  and       
 
Hence, the unconstrained GP does not contract for more than the required number of 
hours with the community health service.  
 
The constrained GP 
This GP experiences patient constraints, implying . With  , (4) can be written: 





      
From (8) we see that a constrained GP has a marginal utility of leisure which is lower 




    . This is a constrained 
optimum, implying that the physician would be willing to fill a part-time position in 
community health service that would otherwise seem unprofitable.  
 
Now we distinguish between two types of constrained GPs. Constrained type 1 has a 
binding minimum requirement constraint while constrained type 2 is not constrained by 
the municipality’s minimum requirement. We show that a binding minimum requirement 
constraint, 0   , occurs when the marginal utility of leisure at 
D l T n t    is 
sufficiently high,  '( )
D v T n t w    , whereas a sufficiently low marginal utility of 
leisure,  '( )
D v T n t w    , results in a non-binding minimum requirement 
constraint, 0   .    99 
 
Constrained type 1 







From (5) we have: 
(9) '( )
D w v T n t       
Implying (10)  '( )
D v T n t w     
 
One may refer to the marginal utility of leisure at 
D l T n t    as the reservation wage 
for voluntary involvement in community health service, and we define: 
 
(11) '( )
D w v T n t     
Differentiating (11) we get: 




    
    
We see that this reservation wage is positively related to the GP’s list size, which means 
that, ceteris paribus, a GP with a long list has a higher reservation wage than a GP with a 
short list. 
 
Constrained type 2 







From (5) we have: 
(12)    '( )
D v T n t w      
Implying 
(13) '( )
D v T n t w        
 
We see that constrained type 2 GPs adjust the amount of hours they contract with the 
community health service such that the marginal utility of leisure equals the wage rate in 
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In optimum, a marginal increase in list size results in a decrease in the hours contracted 
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Abstract 
 
We model physicians as health care professionals who care about their services and monetary 
rewards. These preferences are heterogeneous. Different physicians trade off the monetary and 
service motives differently, and therefore respond differently to incentive schemes. Our model is 
set up for the Norwegian health care system.  First, each private practice physician has a patient 
list, which may have more or less patients than he desires. The physician is paid a fee-for-service 
reimbursement and a capitation per listed patient.  Second, a municipality may obligate the 
physician to perform 7.5 hours per week of community services. Our data are on an unbalanced 
panel of 435 physicians, with 412 physicians for the year 2002, and 400 for 2004.  A physician‟s 
amount of gross wealth and gross debt in previous periods are used as proxy for preferences for 
community service. First, for the current period, accumulated wealth and debt are predetermined. 
Second, wealth and debt capture lifestyle preferences because they correlate with the planned 
future income and spending. The main results show that both gross debt and gross wealth have 
negative effects on physicians‟ supply of community health services. Gross debt and wealth have 
no effect on fee-for-service income per listed person in the physician‟s practice, and positive 
effects on the total income from fee-for-service. The higher income from fee-for-service is due to 
a longer patient list. Patient shortage has no significant effect on physicians‟ supply of 
community services, a positive effect on the fee-for-service income per listed person, and a 
negative effect on the total income from fee for service. These results support physician 
preference heterogeneity.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Economic theory is largely based on a hypothesis of self-interest. To a large extent, it is 
argued, many social phenomena may be explained as outcomes of interactions between selfish 
economic agents. Nevertheless, the selfish economic agent hypothesis is a simplifying 
assumption. Economists do recognize that even their own behaviors are not entirely consistent 
with self-interest, and that many social phenomena cannot be easily explained by it.  
 
The self-interest hypothesis is probably unpalatable when it is applied to the health care 
market. There are serious frictions in the health care market due to hidden information and 
hidden action. One wonders why the complete collapse of the health market had not already 
occurred if physicians and health care professionals were completely guided by their selfish 
goals. In fact, Arrow (1963), in his seminal discussion of the medical market, already has called 
for a broader perspective. He also points out as a matter of fact that health care professionals are 
strongly influenced by ethical conduct, standards of care and service motives.  
 
The literature on physician response to incentives is very large, and a major area in the entire 
health economics field.
2 The focus of this literature is often on the magnitude of empirical 
outcomes of an incentive innovation. For example, if the US Medicare system changes its fee 
structure, will physicians who experience an income loss perform more coronary artery bypass 
grafting procedures (Yip 1998)? Or, do obstetricians perform more cesarean sections when they 
are in financially less rewarding markets (Gruber and Owings 1996)? It is of course important to 
                                                 
2 We cite only two papers here, but health economists will agree with us about this assertion.   106 
study the direct effect of financial incentives on medical treatment. Physicians, however, perform 
services that may not generate the most monetary rewards for them. Arrow‟s “broader” 
perspective calls for studying effects of incentives on the many tasks that physicians perform.  
 
In this paper we model physicians as health care professionals who care about their 
community services. Their preferences are a combination of community service and monetary 
rewards. Furthermore, we let these preferences be heterogeneous; different physicians trade off 
the monetary and service motives differently. Heterogeneity is an important assumption because 
preferences on monetary and service motives determine how physicians react to incentive 
schemes. Those physicians who care more about monetary rewards react more strongly to 
financial incentives than those who do not. 
 
We set up a theoretical model for physician services in Norway. Various components of the 
model reflect the Norwegian health care system. There are two important elements in the 
description of the private practice physicians in Norway. First, each private practice physician 
has a list of patients under his care, and this list may have more or less than the number of 
patients he desires. The physician is paid a fee-for-service reimbursement together with a 
capitation per patient in his practice list.  
 
Second, each physician is obligated to perform some community service in the municipality 
where he works. In fact, a municipality has the power to request 7.5 hours per week of 
community service from a physician. Physicians are paid an hourly wage for their community 
services. This hourly wage is quite low compared to the equivalent earning a physician can make   107 
in private practice. This is the basis for our assumption that physicians are motivated by their 
preferences for community services to the municipalities. Despite a smaller financial reward, 
some physicians actually work more than the legally required amount of community service.  
 
We assemble a data set on an unbalanced panel of 435 physicians, with 412 physicians for 
the year 2002, and 400 for 2004. The information includes physician personal characteristics, 
their community involvements, and private practices. Our estimations identify the effect of 
physician characteristics on their private practice styles as well as their community services. We 
look at services provided by physicians to their patients. Are they affected by whether the 
physicians think that they have enough patients in their lists? Does patient shortage affect 
physicians‟ supply of community health service? 
 
We use a physician‟s amount of wealth and debt in previous periods as proxy for the 
physician‟s preferences for community service. First, for the current period, accumulated wealth 
and debt are predetermined. Second, wealth and debt likely capture lifestyle preferences because 
they correlate with the planned future income and spending. The actual implementation will use 
gross wealth and gross debt in the regressions. The higher is gross debt, the higher the future 
income required to pay for the interest. This likely means that the physician is less interested in 
providing community service, which is financially less rewarding.  
 
In our study, physicians‟ community health service supply decisions are censored because 
municipalities may impose upon physicians up to 7.5 hours of work per week. When the 
dependent variable is censored, a linear regression model will give inconsistent estimates.   108 
Instead, we estimate a random-effects tobit model on physicians‟ community service supply. For 
estimating the effects of indicators of service motive on the physicians‟ private practice service 
supply, we use a standard random-effects model, which controls for unobserved heterogeneity in 
our panel data. 
 
The main results show that both gross debt and gross wealth have negative effects on 
physicians‟ supply of community health service. Gross debt and wealth have no effect on fee-
for-service income per listed person in the physician‟s practice, and positive effects on the total 
income from fee-for-service. The higher income from fee-for-service is due to a longer patient 
list. Patient shortage has no significant effect on physicians‟ supply of community services, a 
positive effect on the fee-for-service income per listed person, and a negative effect on the total 
income from fee for service.  
 
Our results suggest that policies may affect physicians differentially. A mandatory increase 
in the hours of community service municipalities may impose on physicians likely will be 
binding on the majority of physicians, but may not be so for those physicians with lower gross 
wealth and debt. On the other hand, an increase in the remuneration of community services may 
relax this constraint for the majority of physicians, but have little effect on those with lower 
gross wealth and debt. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the study setting and reviews the 
literature. We set up a model in section 3, and derive a set of hypotheses. Section 4 presents the   109 
data and descriptive statistics. In Section 5 the strategy for empirical analysis is explained and 
results are presented. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
 
2.  Study setting and literature review 
 
We use data from Norway in this study. Norway is a country of about 4.5 million inhabitants. 
Norwegians‟ health care is covered by a national health service, which is mainly tax-financed.  
Hospitals are publicly owned, and inpatient care is free to users. Outpatient consultations with 
primary care physicians and specialists are offered respectively with a copayment of about 
US$25 and US$40 in 2006. Since the implementation of the Regular General Practitioner 
Scheme in 2001, each inhabitant of Norway has been listed with a General Practitioner (GP), or 
primary care physician. About 90% of GPs are self-employed, private physicians contracting 
with municipalities, with the remaining GPs employed by the municipalities. Each GP has a list 
of patients. In 2004 the average list-size was between 1250 and 1300 people.  Besides providing 
primary care, GPs act as gatekeepers. A referral by a GP is required for consultations with health 
care specialists. The national insurance covers all expenditures if copayments for physician 
services and medicines within a year exceed a deductible of about US$250. 
 
The Regular General Practitioner Scheme of 2001 required each inhabitant to submit to the 
National Insurance Administration up to three preferred physicians. GPs submitted to the 
Administration the maximum number of patients they were willing to include in the practice list. 
A matching process respecting patient and GP preferences formed the GP patient lists. For many 
physicians the maximum number of patients they were willing to accept exceeded the number of   110 
people who showed interest in being listed with them. The administration then allocated 
inhabitants who did not submit any physician preference (30 percent of the adult population) to 
these GPs. As of June 2001, after this second round of assignments, about 30 percent of the GPs 
still had at least 100 patients less than the number of patients they were willing to take. In the 
paper we say that these GPs experience a shortage or deficit of patients. 
 
Private practice general practitioners have three sources of revenue. First, there is a fee-for-
service payment; a GP provides various services to patients in return for a fee from the national 
insurance. Second, for each consultation, a GP receives a copayment from the patient. Third, a 
GP receives a capitation fee from the municipality in which he serves. The capitation amount is 
based on the number of listed patients with the GP without any risk adjustment. Each of the three 
components constitutes about one third of the income of an average practice.   
 
In Norway preventive health care at childcare centers and schools, and regularly medical care 
at nursing homes and prisons are served by GPs working part-time in municipalities. Such 
community health services are remunerated according to a fixed salary scheme that is negotiated 
between the state and the Norwegian Medical Association. The community service 
remunerations are in terms of hourly wages and tend to be lower than the equivalent rates in 
private practice. GPs are also entitled to a “practice compensation” to cover costs in their 
practice while working for the municipality, and it is paid on an hourly basis. In Godager and 
Lurås (2005) the remuneration rate for community service is estimated to be between 38% and 
66% of the equivalent private practice rate. This range is due to variations in cost reductions in 
GPs‟ private practice while working for the municipality. According to current regulations, a   111 
municipality can require GPs to perform up to 7.5 hours of community services per week. A 
municipality is obliged to strive for an equitable distribution of community health workload 
among the GPs if they choose to enforce the regulation. In nearly all municipalities at least one 
GP works more that 7.5 hours of community work, so it seems that those who work less than 7.5 
hours would not have preferred to work more, but may well have preferred to work less. 
 
Community service is provided in normal work hours and does not substitute for leisure.  A 
physician may have to be absent from his private practice one day a week to provide services at 
nursing homes and childcare centers. We have found a negative correlation between the private 
practice list size and community service hours; this is consistent with community services using 
up physicians‟ time that would otherwise be available for private practice. Generally, physicians 
should find it more rewarding to build reputation through superior services in private practices. 
We regard community services as activities mainly motivated by nonprofit-seeking objectives.  
 
Several papers have studied the impact of economic incentives since the health system 
reform in Norway.  Iversen (2005) studies whether patient shortage will lead a GP to increase 
services provided to patients in the practice. The study shows that GPs with patient shortage in 
fact compensate for their lower capitation payment by earning more fee-for-service incomes. 
Carlsen and Norheim (2003) investigate whether the patient list system has influenced general 
practitioners‟ self-perception as gatekeepers. They find that GPs generally have become less 
concerned with the gatekeeper role. Rather, GPs believe that they should provide better services 
to keep patients from switching to other physicians.  
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In Lurås (2007) a nationally representative sample of Norwegians are surveyed about 
satisfaction with their GPs. She finds that if a patient‟s GP has a patient shortage, then she is 
likely to be dissatisfied in most quality dimensions except waiting time. Iversen and Lurås 
(2008) add to this result by supplementing the earlier study by registrar data. They find that 
patients of GPs with patient shortage tend to switch GPs more often, even though these GPs 
already provide more services.  
 
Using cross sectional data from 2002, Godager and Lurås (2006) study the effect of patient 
shortage on GPs‟ supply of community health service. From tobit regressions, they find that GPs 
experiencing a patient shortage contract for more hours of community health service. The dataset 
used in Godager and Lurås (2006) is the same as the 2002 part of the data in this paper. 
 
We are unaware of any paper that studies the relationship between physician indebtedness 
and physicians‟ service decisions. There are, however, some papers that study the effect of study 
loans on physicians‟ occupational choices. Fox (2003) finds that physicians who have had large 
study loans are less likely to enter academic medicine, which is financially less rewarding. 
Bazzoli (1985) and Thornton (2000) find that medical students‟ magnitude and types of loans 
have an impact on physician specialty choices. Culler and Bazzoli (1985) study factors that 
affect resident physicians taking a second job; when making moonlighting decisions, residents 
are influenced by debt and other economic factors. 
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3.   The model 
 
We present a model of physician decision on private practice and community services. A 
physician has a private practice, where he provides services for patients who are enrolled with 
him. The physician also spends some time to work for the municipality. We call this community 
service. While GPs‟ work in private practice usually belongs to the discipline of general 
medicine, community services at the municipality typically are on nursing home care, prisons, 
vaccination for school children, administrative work, and related community medicines. The 
contract between the physician and the municipality stipulates that a minimum number of hours 
of community service may be required. 
 
The physician receives two kinds of payments for treating patients at his private practice. 
First is the patient list component of the revenue. The physician receives a capitation payment, a 
lump sum per patient who has elected to be in the doctor‟s practice. Second is the fee-for-service 
component of the revenue. The physician receives a payment based on the service that is 
provided to a patient.
3 Community services are also remunerated, and they are paid on an hourly 
basis. 
The payment for a unit of private practice service, s, is denoted by α; the community service 
has an hourly remuneration rate β. While the fee-for-service rate α is based on the quantity of 
services, we will interpret α as an equivalent hourly rate, so that the private-practice and 
community-service remuneration rates are comparable. Alternatively, we may interpret s as 
hours of private practice. The remuneration rate for community service is lower than private 
                                                 
3 Physicians also receive copayments from patients for office consultations, but we will ignore this revenue source.   114 
service, so we assume that α  > β . The last component of payment is the capitation rate per 
patient enrolled in a physician practice; this is denoted by γ. 
 
Let n denote the number of patients who are enrolled in the physician practice, and s the 
service that the physician supplies to a patient. Let a denote the amount of community service 
the physician provides at a municipality. The physician decides on these three variables subject 
to various constraints to be explained below. 
 
The physician incurs a total cost of C(ns + a) when he provides s units of services to each of 
n patients, and when he supplies a units of community service. The cost function includes both 
the physician‟s time cost and other necessary input costs for providing s services to each of n 
patients, and the community service a. For convenience, we have chosen to let cost be a function 
of the sum of private and community services. The function C is increasing and convex. We will 
also assume that it is twice differentiable, and that the marginal cost (first order derivative) 
increases without bound. The physician derives utility θV(a) from community service a. The 
function V is an increasing and concave function, and θ a positive parameter. We postulate that 
the physician is motivated to provide community service,
4 and this motivation is captured by the 
utility θV(a). We will discuss how we proxy for the preference parameter θ. 
 
For simplicity, we have assumed that the physician‟s concern for patients in his private 
practices is purely motivated by profits. This may not seem entirely consistent with the 
assumption that physicians derive a utility from serving the community besides the monetary 
                                                 
4 We assume that voluntary and involuntary community services lead to the same utility. A more general form of the 
utility from community service is  ( , ) Va  , but our results are unaffected by the simpler form θV(a).   115 
remuneration. In the appendix, we have examined the robustness of the model. There we allow 
the physician to derive a utility from serving patients in his private practice, and show that the 
predictions by the model remain valid.  
 
There are two constraints that restrict the physician‟s choice of the number of patients in his 
practice, as well as the service for each patient. First, we let D be the maximum number of 
patients that the physician can have. This maximum demand D is assumed to be exogenously 
given.
5 In a short period of time, the physician cannot influence the total number of patients 
willing to be listed with him. Nevertheless, the physician may decide to serve less than D 
patients. Therefore, the first constraint for the physician is nD  .  
 
In the absence of this constraint, a physician may want to enroll more patients. If indeed the 
physician does want a larger patient list, the constraint will become binding (nD  ), in which 
case we say that the physician has a shortage of patient or that he is rationed.  We will not 
impose a minimum community service constraint now. The basic model will be used later for 
studying this possibility. 
   
The second constraint concerns the physician‟s service intensity. We assume that the service 
per patient, s, is limited to a range [S1,S2], with S1 < S2. This range of services describes the 
physician‟s control on patients, or the extent of physician agency. Superior medical knowledge 
and experience allow the physician to dictate to some extent the services patients receive. 
                                                 
5 Using Norwegian data, Iversen and Lurås (2008) show that service intensity has a negative impact on the number 
of patients switching physicians, but the magnitude of the response is too small to be of importance. 
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Variations in services, however, are subject to some limits. We bound these variations by an 
interval. We assume that S1 and S2 are exogenous. Within this range, the physician is able to 
dictate the service to the patient: 12 S s S  . 
 
Given the payment parameters, fee-for-service rate α, community service rate β, and 
capitation rate γ, if the physician has n patients in his practice, and provides s services to each 
patient, as well as community service a, his payoff is 
(1)     ( , , ) ( ) ( ) U s n a sn a n V a C ns a           .       
The utility function in (1) contains the financial rewards from private practice and community 
service (the first three terms), an enjoyment from serving the municipalities, and the cost of 
services. The physician‟s behavior is described by his choice of n, s and a that maximize his 
utility in (1) subject to the constraints nD   and  12 S s S  . 
 
We begin by considering cases when the constraint nD   does not bind. Here, the physician 
is not rationed and can choose the optimal number of patients for his practice without worrying 
that insufficient patients will elect to join. The first-order condition of U with respect to n is 
(2)  '( ) 0
U
s C ns a
ns

         
   
when the constraint nD   does not bind. Now consider the first-order derivative of U with 
respect to service s: 
(3)    '( ) 0
U




   

.   
From the first order condition (2), the first-order derivative with respect to s in (3) must be 
negative. This implies that the optimal value of s is S1, the lower bound on the range of service.   117 
 
Having an extra patient entitles the physician to obtain the capitation payment. The physician 
cares about total service ns. By reducing s and raising n to keep ns constant, the physician 
already raises his payoff due to the capitation payment.  When there is no patient shortage, the 
physician tends to provide less service and enrolls more patients. 
 
We have not included a utility component in the physician‟s service in the private practice. 
Such a utility may tend to raise the value of s in the above calculation. The tendency to increase  
n due to capitation remains robust for many utility specifications; see the Appendix. 
  
Next, we differentiate the objective function U with respect to community service a: 
(4)  '( ) '( )
U




   

. 
From (3), and the assumption that α  > β, the expression in (4) must be strictly negative when  θ 
is sufficiently small. Community service has a lower remuneration (α  > β). If the physician does 
not value community service sufficiently, he chooses the minimal level.  
 
Now we consider the case when the constraint nD   binds. Here the first-order derivative of 
U with respect to n is positive at n = D : 
'( ) 0
U
s C Ds a
ns

         
. 
The first-order derivative with respect to s is  
  '( ) .
U
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If D is small, then the first-order derivative evaluated at s = S1 will likely be positive and the 
optimal s is strictly bigger than S1 . In fact, the first-order derivative may remain positive for all 
service levels, so that we may have a corner solution s = S2. In such an equilibrium the 
community service a will be decreasing in D.  For an interior solution, s is in [S1,S2], and will be 
given by setting the above first-order derivative to zero. Finally, the first-order derivative (4) 
applies, and for an equilibrium where  0 a  , it will be set at zero. 
 
When the constraint nD   binds, and when the physician picks a service per patient in the 
interior of [S1,S2], we can use the first order conditions: 
    '( ) 0 C Ds a      
  '( ) '( ) 0 V a C Ds a       
to obtain comparative static results. At the service intensity interior solution, the equilibrium 
community service a is increasing in the preference parameter θ, but does not vary with the 
rationed list size D while the equilibrium service s is decreasing in D.
 6  
 
A physician having stronger preferences for community services will cut back more on 
private practice. This is because community services raise the marginal cost of supplying 
services to patients. Finally, a higher value of θ implies a larger supply of community service. 
 
The community service parameter θ may capture physicians‟ preferences on lifestyle and 
work over the long term. Our model can be regarded as a component of a physician‟s dynamic 
decisions on his private practice and community services. The decision variables are current 
                                                 
6 Use the two first-order conditions to eliminate the term  ' C  to get  '( ). Va      Hence, given an interior 
solution of s a change of community service a  is only related to  .   119 
choices while the parameters capture earlier decisions such as wealth and debt accumulations. 
For the empirical implementation, we proxy the community service parameter θ by gross wealth 
and gross debt under the assumption that θ is decreasing in these variables. 
 
A physician who does not value community services highly may prefer luxurious 
consumption, which often takes the form of durables. Such a physician likely accumulates more 
wealth and debt in his financial portfolio. Perhaps more important, his higher debt obligation 
cannot afford him the “luxury” of performing community service, which has a much lower 
remuneration than in private practice.
7 These observations are consistent with our assumption 
that θ is decreasing in wealth and debt. 
 
On the other hand, luxurious consumption may be on nondurable. A physician with this 
aptitude may not accumulate high wealth and debt, although he prefers to perform little 
community service.  The behavior of such a physician is less agreeable with our assumption, 
which would identify him as one with a high value of θ. Our empirical results then would not 
yield any significant effects. Hence, our assumption that θ is decreasing in wealth and debt is 
conservative. 
 
  To summarize, we list several predictions of our model:  
1.  Physicians who have patient shortage tend to supply more service per patient; conversely, 
physicians who have no patient shortage tend to supply less service per patient. 
                                                 
7 Furthermore, the amount of wealth and debt in a financial portfolio likely depends on a person‟s lifecycle, which is 
controlled by the age variables.  
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2.  Physicians‟ community service does not depend on the list size when they face a patient 
shortage and when the optimal service per patient is an interior solution.  
3.  With both patient shortage and constrained service per patient, the physicians‟ 
community service is decreasing in the rationed list size. 
4.  The stronger are physicians‟ preferences for community service, the larger the amount of 
community service they supply and the shorter the preferred list of patients. When 
physicians‟ gross wealth and debt are negatively related to their preferences for 
community services, physicians who have accumulated higher gross wealth and debt 
perform less community services. 
 
4.  Data and descriptives 
 
A survey of 35 Norwegian municipalities and two districts of the city of Oslo form the basis 
of the data for analysis. This survey was initiated by us and put together by municipality 
administrative staff. The data contain information of physicians who participated in community 
health services at the said municipalities and districts for the years 2002 and 2004. 
 
The municipalities and Oslo districts in the survey were randomly selected within groups 
stratified according to geography and a measure of centrality according to the classification by 
Statistics Norway (Norwegian Official Statistics, 1999).
8 The stratification aims to obtain a 
representative sample of Norwegian municipalities. In 2002, all municipalities responded to the 
survey, while in 2004, four municipalities failed to respond (a corresponding 89% response rate). 
                                                 
8 The classification assigns each municipality to one of four groups based on travel time from the municipality to the 
nearest densely populated area.   121 
The four municipalities that did not respond were small, and so were the numbers of physicians 
in these municipalities relative to the total. 
 
The survey data were merged with registrar data from the Norwegian primary physician 
database, which describes characteristics of each GP and each GP‟s patient list.
9 GP 
characteristics include age, gender, number of children according to age groups, taxable income, 
wealth and debt. The GP practice characteristics include preferred numbers of patients, actual 
number of patients according to gender and age, and the total fees from national insurance.  
 
Primary care physicians who did not provide any community service were not in the survey. 
The municipalities simply did not register these physicians in their administrative files. Those 
physicians in the registrar data who did not appear in the survey were assigned zero hours of 
community service in the corresponding municipalities or Oslo districts. 
 
For confidentiality and privacy protection, each physician in the survey was informed and 
given the opportunity to withdraw participation from the survey. No such request was received 
and the merged data from the 2002 survey was made available for research four months after 
data collection. The merged data from the 2004 survey was available for the researchers eight 
months after data collection. 
 
The data set is an unbalanced panel of 484 physicians. There were 466 physicians for the 
year 2002, and 440 in the year 2004. We exclude GPs who contract with more than one 
                                                 
9 The Norwegian primary physician database is administered by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service (NSD) 
and provides information of individual GPs.  
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municipality (6 physicians each year) because we are unable to disaggregate their total practice 
income into the municipality sources. We also exclude salaried GPs (28 physicians in 2002 and 
22 physicians in 2004) because their economic incentives are different from the private GPs who 
contract with a municipality.  Then we exclude those GPs who were both salaried and contracted 
with more than one municipality (1 physician each year not in the previous exclusions). In the 
primary physician registrar, information of Annual income from fees from national insurance or 
Gross debt and Gross wealth was missing for 19 physicians in 2002 and for 11 physicians in 
2004. Our analysis is then based on data of a total of legitimate 812 observations (412 in 2002 
and 400 in 2004) of 435 GPs. 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the full panel. The last two columns decompose the 
total variation into „between physician‟ (b) and „within physician‟ (w) variation.
10  On average a 
physician works 4.88 hours per week of community health services, with a maximum of 22.5 
hours per week.  The between variation as a proportion of total variation is 71 percent and 
accordingly, the within variation is 29 percent of the total variation. About 14 percent of the GPs 
work more than the 7.5 hours per week, which is the legal requirement that a municipality may 
impose on GPs. On average a GP‟s preferred list size (1393) is slightly larger than the actual list 
size (1316). While 22 percent of the GPs experience a shortage of patients, 8 percent have a list 







                                                 
10 While „between physician variation‟ measures the variation in physician averages, „within physician variation‟ 
measures the variation around the average of the two periods for each physician.    123 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the panel 
 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  b  w 
Total-hour  Total hours per week in 
community health service  4.88  4.27  0  22.5  0.71  0.29 
Volunt-hour  Binary variable set to 1 if Total-
hour>7.5, otherwise 0  0.14    0  1  0.65  0.35 
Prefer-list  The GP’s preferred list size  1393  378  100  2500  0.76  0.24 
List  Actual list size  1316  383  98  2798  0.79  0.21 
Prop-female  Proportion of females on list  0.51  0.10  0.25  0.86  0.92  0.08 
Prop-old  Proportion of 70 and older on 
list  0.11  0.06  0.00  0.37  0.88  0.12 
Shortage  Binary variable set to 1 if 
(Prefer-list – list)>100, 
otherwise 0  0.22    0  1  0.54  0.46 
Many  Binary variable set to 1 if 
(Prefer-list – list)<-100, 
otherwise 0  0.08    0  1  0.50  0.50 
Total-FFS  Annual income (NOK) from fees 
from national insurance  558102  285717  875  2702649  0.70  0.30 
FFS-NI  Annual income (NOK) from fees 
from National insurance per 
listed person  440.38  251.24  0.84  3677.85  0.47  0.53 
Gr-debt  Gross debt in million NOK  1.15  1.08  0  6.86  1.00  0.00 
Gr-wealth  Gross wealth in million NOK  1.21  0.92  0  8.21  1.00  0.00 
Net-wealth  Net wealth in million NOK  0.06  1.36  -5.32  4.79  1.00  0.00 
Gen-Med  Binary variable set to 1 if GP 
specialist in general medicine, 
otherwise 0    0.59    0  1  1.00  0.00 
Comm-Med  Binary variable set to 1 if GP 
specialist in community 
medicine, otherwise 0  0.06    0  1  1.00  0.00 
Mid-age  Binary variable set to 1 if 
40<GP’s age ≤ 55  0.57    0  1  1.00  0.00 
Old-age  Binary variable set to 1 if GP’s 
age > 55  0.17    0  1  1.00  0.00 
Male  Binary variable set to 1 if GP is 
a male, otherwise 0  0.74    0  1  1.00  0.00 
Married  Binary variable set to 1 if GP is 
a married, otherwise 0  0.78    0  1  0.89  0.11 
Low-Central  Binary variable set to 1 if 
municipality has lowest level of 
centrality; otherwise 0  0.04    0  1  1.00  0.00 
Med-Central   Binary variable set to 1 if 
municipality has second lowest 
level of centrality; otherwise 0  0.07    0  1  1.00  0.00 
High-1-
Central 
 Binary variable set to 1 if 
municipality has second highest 
level of centrality; otherwise 0  0.19    0  1  1.00  0.00 
High-
Central 
Binary variable set to 1 if 
municipality has highest level of 
centrality; otherwise 0  0.70    0  1  1.00  0.00 
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As described previously, a GP‟s total practice income consists of capitation fees (NOK 299 
per person
11 listed in 2003), patient copayments and service fees from the national insurance. We 
do not have reliable data on patient copayments. However, as patient copayments and service 
fees from the national insurance are both proportional to the volume of services provided, we use 
the annual income from national insurance fees as a proxy for the fee-for-service income. From 
Table 1 the mean of this fee is NOK 558102 per physician per year. 
 
Table 1 also displays the average physician debt and wealth. Gross wealth (Gr-wealth) is 
defined as the sum of real capital (including housing value) and financial assets (bank deposits 
and other financial assets). Gross debt (Gr-debt) is personal debt including mortgage balance. 
Net wealth (Net-wealth) is the difference between gross wealth and gross debt.  The mean gross 
debt is 1.15 million NOK, while the mean gross wealth is 1.21 million NOK. Together these 
figures imply a positive average net wealth. The variation in the debt and wealth figures is 
considerable. Because we only have data on wealth and debt for the year 2002, the within 
physician variation is zero for these variables. The majority of GPs are between 40 and 55 years 
old, and 74 per cent of them are men. Seventy-eight per cent of GPs are married, and they have 
on average 0.27 children below six years of age. About 6 percent of physicians are specialists in 
community medicine, while 59 percent have earned a specialist degree in general medicine. 
From Table 1, 4 percent of the GPs practice in a municipality with the lowest level of centrality, 
while 70 percent practice in a municipality with the highest level of centrality.    
 
                                                 
11 1 USD was approximately 6.30 NOK in 2003.   125 
Wealth and debt are measured at the individual level. A GP‟s decisions are likely influenced 
both by the spouse‟s wealth and debt, too. We would prefer to have access to household wealth 
and debt, but because this information is unavailable to us, we could only use a physician‟s 
marital status (Married) as a control. In auxiliary regressions we have introduced interaction 
terms between  Married and Wealth/Debt to check whether marital status affects the impact of 
Wealth/Debt. These interaction terms have not yielded statistically significant effect, and we 
have dropped them (so they do not appear in Tables 3 and 4 below). 
 
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics according to physicians‟ involvement in 
community health services. We categorize the information according to whether the physicians 
work more or less than 7.5 hours, the obligation that municipalities may impose upon them. 
Those physicians who work more than 7.5 hours may have chosen to do so voluntarily. Those 
physicians who work voluntary hours have shorter preferred lists and actual lists. However, the 
two groups of physicians share similar characteristics with respect to gender and elderly 
proportion in their patient lists.  The proportion of GPs with patient shortage is higher among 
those who work voluntary hours of community health service (28 percent) than those who do not 
(21 percent)
12. GPs who work less than 7.5 hours have both higher gross debt and gross wealth, 
but those who work more than 7.5 hours have a higher net wealth. Finally, those who work 
voluntary hours at municipalities are more likely to be specialists in community medicine. 
 
                                                 
12 Likewise, the proportion doing voluntary community health service conditional on Shortage is 17 percent, and the 
proportion doing voluntary community health service conditional on Many is 4 percent .   126 
Gross wealth and gross debt are independent variables in the regressions.
13 As we have 
argued in the previous section, those physicians who have higher levels of gross wealth are likely 
to have a more affluent lifestyle, and those who have higher debt require more income to pay for 
finance charges and interests. We associate weaker preferences for community services with 
higher physician gross wealth and debt. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics according to physician community health service 
 
  Volunt-hour = 0 (No. obs. = 700)  Volunt-hour = 1 (No. obs. = 112) 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max 
                 
Total-hour  3.60  2.62  0  7.5  12.83  4.02  8  22.5 
Prefer-list  1412  377  100  2500  1274  362  300  2000 
List  1336  385  98  2798  1187  349  212  2045 
Prop-female  0.51  0.10  0.28  0.86  0.50  0.10  0.25  0.76 
Prop-old  0.10  0.06  0.00  0.35  0.12  0.07  0.00  0.37 
Shortage  0.21    0  1  0.28    0  1 
Many  0.09    0  1  0.03    0  1 
Total-FFS  562691  293449  875  2702649  529421  230673  32892  1344763 
FFS-NI  435.65  255.99  0.84  3677.85  469.99  217.95  26.33  1527.60 
Gr-debt  1.19  1.10  0  6.86  0.89  0.85  0  3.35 
Gr-wealth  1.24  0.96  0  8.21  1.02  0.56  0.03  2.67 
Net-wealth  0.06  1.41  -5.32  4.79  0.13  1.06  -2.37  2.36 
Gen-Med  0.58    0  1  0.63    0  1 
Comm-Med  0.04    0  1  0.20    0  1 
Mid-age  0.54    0  1  0.71    0  1 
Old-age  0.18    0  1  0.12    0  1 
Male  0.73    0  1  0.79    0  1 
Married  0.76    0  1  0.79    0  1 
Low-Central  0.03    0  1  0.11    0  1 
Med-Central  0.07    0  1  0.10    0  1 
High-1-
Central 
0.19    0  1  0.19    0  1 
High-Central  0.71    0  1  0.61    0  1 
 
 
                                                 
13 Since Net wealth = Gross wealth – Gross debt, we could have used any two of the three measures in the 
regressions. We also have access to data on interest payment. The coefficient of correlation between Gross debt and 
interest payment is 0.93, so interest payment does not add any information.    127 
5.  Empirical specification and results 
 
We would like to know what determines GPs‟ community services and private practice. The 
predictions of our model are summarized at the end of Section 3. The exogenous variables in the 
model are used as regressors. Hence, Shortage, Many, Gr-debt and Gr-wealth are included in 
order to test predictions from our theory. In addition, we include Prop-female and Prop-old to 
control for variation in list compositions. We also control for several physician characteristics, 
such as socio-demographic factors (Mid-age, Old-age, Male and Married) and type of specialty 
(Gen-Med and Comm-Med) because physicians who have chosen a specialty in community 
medicine likely provide more hours of community services. Finally, we adjust for the level of 
centrality of the municipality a physician practices in. For instance, distance to the nearest 
hospital is correlated with a municipality‟s centrality and possibly has an impact on private 
physician practice and community health service. 
 
In our study, GPs‟ labor supply decisions on community service are censored because 
municipalities may impose up to 7.5 hours of work per week on each physician. Furthermore, in 
our data, we observe cases in which GPs work less than 7.5 hours. We do not know if individual 
GPs are experiencing an enforced minimum requirement, so we must allow the censoring 
threshold to vary between GPs. In other words, each physician faces his own censoring 
threshold. When the dependent variable is censored, a linear regression model will give 
inconsistent estimates (Tobin, 1958). Many tobit models have been developed to take account of 
a censored dependent variable, and such models are frequently used in labor econometrics 
(Moffit, 1999).    128 
 
Different municipalities may want different numbers of hours of community services from 
GPs. A municipality might only let a GP work a fraction of the time of community service that 
GP would have preferred. This kind of rationing by municipalities on GPs‟ community service 
seems improbable in our setting. Survey data from Norway show that only three per cent of GPs 
working less than eight hours of community work would have preferred more. Furthermore, 
municipalities are required to strive for an equitable distribution of hours of community work 
among GPs. In practice, equitable distribution means that a GP should not be asked to work more 
than 7.5 hours if someone else with less than 7.5 hours of work would prefer more. In our data 
only in six municipalities did all GPs there work less than 7.5 hours; altogether, there were a 
total of 28 GPs (or six percent of the total) in these six municipalities. We continue with the 
assumption that whenever a physician is observed to have worked less than 7.5 hours, it is a 
censored observation. 
 
Let  it y   denote the number of hours of community service GP i prefers to work in time period 
t; we regard   it y   as a latent variable. Further let it y  denote the actual number of hours of 
community service GP i has provided in time period t. When  it y is less than 7.5, we do not know 
if this is a result of the physician‟s choice or the municipality‟s imposition, and can only infer 
that  it it yy   . In this case we say that the physician‟s community service supply has been 
censored. Again, note that the censoring threshold on  it y  is allowed to vary across physicians 
and periods. For  7.5 it y   we assume that the community service provided is the GP‟s own 
choice. We assign the individual specific thresholds in period t,  it c , according to the following   129 
rule:    0  when  7.5, and    when  0,7.5 it it it it it c y c y y     . Letting  it I  denote an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if  it y  is censored, and 0 otherwise, we specify our censored regression model: 
   1- + it it it i it it it y I x u I c      , 
where is a   vector of parameters, and it x a vector of explanatory variables. The variable 
i u denotes random effects and is assumed to be i.i.d.  (0, ) u N   while  it  ‟s are residuals and are 
assumed to be i.i.d. (0, ) N    and independent of  i u . The estimation is by maximum likelihood in 
STATA 10. The main results of the estimation are in Table 3.   
 
Table 3  The estimated effect of physician characteristics on hours of community health 
service. Random-effects tobit model. 
  Total-hour   
     
Prop-female  -3.62 (11.44)   
Prop-old  23.54 (16.28)   
Shortage  -0.24 (1.36)   
Many  -4.84 (2.74)   
Gr-debt  -2.53
* (1.01)
   
Gr-wealth  -3.70
* (1.59)
   
Gen-Med  1.58 (2.02)   
Comm-Med  10.36
** (3.30)
   
Mid-age  3.09 (2.46)   
Old-age  -4.32 (3.65)   
Male  2.08 (2.81)   
Married  -0.28 (1.72)   
Med-Central  -0.12 (4.77)   
High-1-Central  -6.51
 (4.14)
   
High-Central  -5.94
 (3.79)
   
Constant  -4.80 (8.27)   
   0.92    
No. left-censored observations  700   
No. of observations  812   
No. GPs  435   







**') indicate that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the five (one) 
percent level for a two-tailed test. 
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From Table 3, both Gr-debt and Gr-wealth have negative and statistically significant effects 
on GPs‟ total number of hours of community health service. These are according to the 
prediction of our model. The magnitude of these effects is large. An increase of 10 percent from 
the mean of Gr-debt and Gr-wealth (which results in no change in net wealth) is expected to 
decrease community service by about 0.6 hours, or 12 per cent of the mean number of hours 
worked. Being a specialist in community medicine (Comm-Med) contributes positively to 
community service, while a higher degree of centrality has a negative effect.  Patient shortage 
(Shortage) has a statistically insignificant effect on GPs‟ supply of community service. 
 
We use a standard parameter to measure the latent, physician-specific heterogeneity in the 
supply of community health service. This parameter, ρ, is defined as the ratio of the variance of 











The parameter has the alternative interpretation of the coefficient of correlation between two 
„gross disturbances‟ from the same physician in different years. The value of ρ=0.92 indicates 
that the unobserved heterogeneity is significant. Accounting for physician heterogeneity in 
community health service supply is important for the estimation.  
 
As a robustness check we run a binary random-effects logit model in which the dependent 
variable is set to one if the physician works more than 7.5 hours of community services and to 
zero otherwise. We find that the effects of gross wealth and gross debt come up with similar 
signs and levels of statistical significance as in the random-effects tobit model. 
   131 
We are also interested in estimating the impact of the indicators of service motive on the 
provision of services in the physicians‟ private practices. Again, since we have panel data, we are 
able to account for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation. We fit a standard model
14 of the 
form: 
'      ( 1,....,435; 1,2) it it i it z v i t       x ,         
where zit is the dependent variable for GP i in time period t, and xit a vector of explanatory 
variables. We will use the national insurance total income from fees, both average (with respect 
to list size) and total, as the dependent variables. The variable αi is a GP-specific random variable 
that captures unobserved GP heterogeneity; this effect is constant over time. Finally,  it v denotes 







(a)    E ( )=0, 
(b)   Var ( )= 
(c)   Cov ( , )= 0
(d)    ( ) 0
(e)    ( )



















If the random effects model is valid, we must have  , ( , ) 0 i i t Cov x   . We test this restriction 
by a standard Hausman-test.
15 From Table 4 we see that the Hausman statistic is not statistically 




                                                 
14 See for instance Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Ch. 21. 
15 If the restriction is rejected, the fixed effects model is selected. In the fixed-effects model αi cancels; hence, the 
model is robust. When they are valid, the random effects estimators are more efficient than the fixed effects 
estimators. In addition, we are able to test the effect of time-invariant variables.  
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Table 4 The estimated effect of physician characteristics on the total and per listed-patient 
fee-for-service incomes. Random-effects model with robust standard errors. 
 
  FFS-NI  Total-FFS 
     
Prop-female  390.73 (270.99)  501735
** (160284)
 







Many  -5.68 (22.03)  65291
* (29382)
 
Gr-debt  12.10 (11.80)  51372
** (15246)
 








Comm-Med  21.27 (44.67)  -72471 (42089) 
Mid-age  -5.10 (27.93)  -20497 (36924) 







Married  10.95 (26.10)  21567 (25449) 
Med-Central  -86.85 (64.48)  21207 (57088) 
High-1-Central  -68.89 (65.33)  101764 (54427) 
High-Central  -131.19
* (60.99)  53653 (45773) 
Constant  144.19 (174.83)  -114233 (113115) 
     
   0.36  0.75 
No. of observations  812  812 
No. GPs  435  435 








CHISQ(6) = 9.70 
p-value = 0.084 
CHISQ(6) = 9.04 




**') indicate that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the five (one) 
percent level for a two-tailed test. 
 
Table 4 shows the effects of explanatory variables on the revenue from fee-for-service per 
listed person and the total revenue from fee for service. Patient Shortage has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the fee-for-service income per listed person, and a negative 
effect on the total income. Hence, we reject the hypothesis that more services to listed patients 
fully compensates for patient shortage. Also, from Table 4 neither Gr-debt nor Gr-wealth has an 
effect on service provision per listed person. However, there is a positive effect of these variables 
on the total fee-for-service income. Together these results imply that the additional income   133 
comes from a larger patient list. Simultaneous doubling in Gr-wealth and in Gr-debt from the 
mean is predicted to increase fee-for-service income by 20 percent of the average annual fee-for-
service income from national insurance among physicians in our sample.  
 
Being a specialist in general medicine (Gen-Med) has a positive effect on both total and per-
patient fee-for-service income. This is likely due to the fact that specialists in general medicine 
receive an additional fee per consultation from the national insurance.  Also, from Table 4, a GP 
being male increases both the number of services per listed patient and the total fee-for-service 
income. The higher total income for male GPs is due to higher service intensity and longer lists. 
 
We have also estimated the impact on preferred list size of gross wealth and gross debt by a 
regression model with random effects. Both variables are found to have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on preferred list size. Hence, this result supports prediction 4 of 
Section 3. We also find that being a specialist in general medicine, being male and being located 
in a municipality with a high level of centrality all contribute to a greater preferred list size. 
Being a specialist in community medicine and married both contribute to a small preferred list.  
 
Municipality characteristics may be important determinants for physicians‟ decisions. A 
municipality‟s level of centrality picks up important location characteristics, and we have 
included three municipality dummies in the analyses. None turns out to be statistically significant 
in the analyses of hours of community services. In the analysis of fee-for-service income we only 
find that the highest level of centrality has a negative impact on the fee-for-service income per 
listed person. As an alternative to including dummies for municipality types we perform a two   134 
level analysis of fee-for-service income with physicians nested in municipalities. These analyses 
do not change the sign and significance of the effects compared with the results in Table 4. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
 
It is widely believed that many professionals hold high standards in how they should 
perform. Financial incentives are important, but not sufficient to determine their behaviors. 
Physicians are highly skilled professionals who have undertaken long trainings and maintain a 
commitment to the well-being of their patients. It is natural to expect that their behaviors are 
driven by a complex set of motives. In this paper, we have set out to investigate this set of 
motives for physicians in Norway. 
 
We have shown that physicians respond to incentives in a heterogeneous way.  Despite their 
lower remunerations, community services are undertaken by a significant fraction of physicians 
beyond the minimum required amount. We model this by postulating that GPs deriving utility 
from both financial returns and treating patients and performing tasks in the community health 
service. We proxy the preferences for community services with gross wealth and gross debt, and 
find them to be both statistical and quantitatively significant. Those GPs with lower gross wealth 
and gross debt tend to perform more community services; lower gross wealth and gross debt 
likely capture a more modest lifestyle and a stronger commitment to the service motive.  
 
Policy implications of our study are important. Financial incentives cannot be expected to 
affect all physicians in a homogeneous way. Physicians likely respond to any set of incentives in   135 
complex ways. In our study, lifestyles, proxied by physicians‟ gross wealth and gross debt, affect 
how they choose to supply community services. Much research is needed to identify other 
factors that contribute to their decisions. 
 
Appendix: Physician deriving utility from serving patients in private practices 
 
We now modify the utility function to check the robustness of results. We first let the utility 
function in (1) be modified to the following: 
 
(1.A)    ( , , ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) U s n a W n s sn a n V a C ns a            .     
Here the new term  ( , ) W n s is the utility from providing care tonpatients at the intensity of 
sservices per patient. We assume that W is increasing and concave. We further specialize the 
function into two cases: (i) W takes the form  () nW s , and (ii) W takes the form () W ns . Case (i) 
says that the physician derives a utility  () Ws per private patient, and when there are n patients, 
the total utility is simplyntimes the per-patient utility. Case (ii) says that the physician derives a 
utility that is based on the aggregate services to all patients. Case (i) seems plausible, and we 
study it in some details. The analysis for Case (ii) is straightforward, and we will omit it.  
 
We study the case when the quantity constraint nD   does not bind. The first-order 
condition with respect to n for the maximization of the modified utility function is 
          ( ) '( ) 0. s W s sC ns a          
Dividing throughout bys, we get   136 







         
   
Next we consider the first-order derivative of the modified utility function with respect tos : 
          '( ) '( ) 0 n W s C ns a         
where the inequality follows from the concavity of W  ( '( ) ( )/ W s W s s  ) and the preceding 
inequality (from the first-order condition with respect ton). Hence, the physician optimally 
chooses to lower the service per patient while choosing more patients. 
 
In Case (i), the physician‟s altruistic preferences towards private patients is increasing in the 
services per patient, but at a decreasing rate. So a higher utility level may be achieved by simply 
adding more patients to the practice; more patients in the practice also mean more capitation 
income. For a general altruistic utility  ( , ) W n s , there may be a tendency for the service to rise 
above the minimum. This does not alter the fundamental incentive for increasing the patient list 
due to the capitation payment .  
 
In a second variation of the utility modification, we can think of  as a parameter that 
indicates a physician‟s tradeoff between monetary profit and private and community services. In 
this case, we modify the objective function accordingly: 
  (1.B)             ( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) U s n a sn a n V a W s C ns a             
Again the benevolent physician experiences some benefit from performing tasks in the 
community health service, () Va, and further experience some benefit from providing services in 
the private practice () Ws. A physician having an objective function specified in (1.B) has an   137 
altruistic attitude to providing services to the individuals who are actually listed in the practice, 
but this altruistic attitude is independent of list size.  
 
We assume that  () Wsis strictly concave and for simplicity we also assume that  () Ws 
possesses properties that ensure that the physician chooses a service intensity in the interior of 
[S1,S2]. We study the case when the constraint nD   does not bind.  
 
The first-order condition with respect to n for the maximization of (1.B) is  
  '( ) 0 s C ns a s           
This can be expressed as: 
  '( ) 0 C ns a s
s

       
Next we consider the first-order condition with respect tos : 
        '( ) '( ) 0 W s n C ns a n          










     . 







The marginal benefit from service intensity is set proportional to the marginal benefit from 
the list size. In this version of the model, there is a tradeoff between service intensity and list 
size. Since the physician derives some utility from providing services in the private practice, he   138 
balances the incentive from the capitation payment  from a longer list and low service intensity 
with the incentive to have high service intensity due to the service motives implicit in the 
function () Ws  .  
By totally differentiating the system of equations implied by the three first-order 







  and 0
da
d
 . The results of the model specification implied by the objective 
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